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SOCIAL WELFARE GLOSSARY 
 
Claimant: a person applying for a payment in his/her own 
right either for themselves or for themselves and child or 
adult dependants.  
 
Contingency: this refers to a specific “state” which a person 
must be able to prove in order to be eligible for payment, for 
example disability, illness, old age, unemployment.  
 
Contribution record: record of amount of PRSI paid or 
credited to people during their working lives.  
 
Credits disregards: in 1994 a scheme was introduced 
allowing homemakers to disregard a period spent caring for 
under-12s at home. A maximum of 20 years can be 
disregarded when calculating the claimant’s eligibility to a 
social insurance based pension.  
 
Governing contribution year: the year(s) in which you must 
have paid a certain number of PRSI contributions (or 
received a certain number of PRSI credits) to be eligible for a 
social insurance payment. 
 
Irish social welfare system: Irish system of income support 
administered by the Department of Social and Family Affairs. 
 
Limitation rule: the limitation rule refers to the social 
assistance payment structure where in households where 
both adults have eligibility for a payment in their own right (for 
example, both are unemployed) the total payment to the 
household is reduced to 1.7 times the rate of two adult 
payments. This rule does not apply to two old-age pensioners 
or both adults have individual entitlement to disability 
allowance.  
 
Means test: there are four specific tests for different 
categories of income. Income from earnings (and income 
from spouse’s earnings). Benefit and privilege (that is the 
value of living in the family home). Savings and investments. 
Rental income from property. 
 
Pay-related social insurance (PRSI) payments: Employed 
people pay insurance (usually a per cent of earnings) into a 
fund that then covers them should they be unable to work. 
 
Pre-entry credits: are given when you first start work and 
are awarded retrospectively to the beginning of the tax year 
in which you start work and the previous two tax years. 
 
Qualified adult allowance: payment issued to a claimant in 
respect of a qualified adult, formerly adult dependant 
allowance.  
 
Qualified adult: a claimant can claim a payment (for non old-
age payments usually 70 per cent of the adult payment) 
when the claimant can prove a spouse or partner does not 
have a social welfare payment in their own right or earn 
adequate income from employment (€88.88 per week or 
more), formerly called adult dependant.  
Secondary benefits: a collective term given to a group of 
payments, mainly the medical card, housing supplements or 
subsidies, fuel allowances, back-to-school allowances and 
Christmas bonuses and free schemes for those on old-age 
pensions. The term secondary benefits has no particular 
legal meaning, but is usually used to describe the non-cash 
benefits a person on social welfare might be getting in 
addition to their main payment such as the back-to-school 
allowances etcetera. It is important to note that some of these 
schemes (in particular, medical cards and differential rents) 
are major schemes in their own right and are available 
subject to conditions such as means tests both to people on 
social welfare and to people whose income is from other 
source, in other words they are not linked to a “main” social 
welfare payment. 
 
Signing on for credits: people getting certain payments 
from the Department of Social and Family Affairs (for 
example, unemployment benefit, disability benefit, maternity 
benefit) automatically get credits. People not getting a 
payment but eligible for credits have to show they qualify (for 
example by sending in medical certificates in the case of 
illness, or by “signing on” as unemployed). A person out of 
the PRSI system (paid or credited) for more than two years 
will normally have to pay 26 PRSI contributions before 
claiming credits. 
 
Social assistance payments: these are means tested and 
funded totally by the Exchequer. To qualify, a person must 
prove a contingency and pass a means test. 
 
Social insurance credits: are designed to protect the social 
insurance record of someone who has already been in 
insurable employment but is temporarily unable to work 
(either short-term or long-term) for specific reasons such as 
unemployment, illness or certain types of caring work. 
 
Supplementary welfare allowance: a means-tested safety 
net system for those who fall out of social insurance or 
assistance because they cannot prove any of the 
contingencies or because they have a specific need that 
cannot be met in the mainstream social welfare system.  
 
Universal payments: a class of payments paid to everyone 
who passes a specific contingency and are paid regardless of 
means and social insurance record. 
 
Voluntary PRSI contributions: If aged under 66 and no 
longer covered by PRSI, you can pay voluntary contributions 
so you can be covered for a limited range of social insurance 
payments. Payment is usually a percentage of income or, if 
on a very low income, a fixed amount. 
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 FOREWORD 
 
National Women’s Council of Ireland  
The National Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI) 
commissioned this research because of its concern that the 
social welfare system continues to deny women full 
independence. Even now, in 2003, the system reinforces a 
notion of women as adult dependants, rather than as 
individuals entitled to benefits in their own right. Furthermore, 
the social welfare system fails to give adequate recognition to 
women’s unpaid caring work. The consequences of this 
failure are the higher-than-average risks of poverty 
experienced by certain categories of women who are, or 
have been, engaged in caring work for long periods, 
particularly lone parents and older women.  
 
We are seeking in this research to advance a model of social 
welfare reform that promotes the economic independence of 
women within the social welfare code and enables individual 
(non-derived) rights to social welfare. The NWCI strongly 
advocates a rights approach that recognises economic 
independence within the family as an essential precursor to 
realising full citizenship rights for women in society. This 
definition emphasises the need for personal freedom and 
independence as a fundamental principle underpinning a 
rights approach to equality.  
 
Importance of Rights  
The NWCI advocates a rights-based approach to economic 
independence for women. A social justice perspective on 
rights sees rights as existing irrespective of a person’s 
standing in the market. The NWCI does not consider the 
inequalities resulting from exclusively market outcomes to be 
acceptable. Instead, rights are urgently needed to correct the 
unjust market outcomes in a collective way where everyone 
shares the costs (Murphy and O Flynn, 2000).  
 
In this context, a rights-based approach is understood to 
mean a direct individual legislative entitlement to a particular 
resource, for example a social welfare payment. The 
previous National Economic and Social Council Strategy 
(1999) acknowledged the importance of social and economic 
rights which underpin equality of opportunity. 
 
The most recent NESC report states that “the social welfare 
code needs to harmonise more with labour market 
developments and with progress in individualising the tax 
code… [with] the choice of couples to make separate and 
independent claims,… [also that] consideration be given to 
abolition of the ‘limitation rule’ [and] to allowing those seeking 
part-time employment, because of caring responsiblities in 
the home, to register as seeking work. The ability of [these] 
people to build up credits within the insurance system … 
should be explored.” (NESC, 2003). 
Using the basis of the Convention for the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Beijing Platform for 
Action commits to a rights-based approach by seeking action 
to “revise laws and administrative practices in order to ensure 
women’s equal rights and access to economic resources.” 
The development of a rights-based approach aimed at 
securing economic independence for women is consistent 
with these international instruments.  
 
What Women Want 
The NWCI’s position has been formed by the views and 
needs of its affiliate organisations. Our position is based on a 
number of consultation processes with affiliates for our 
research on women and poverty, our submissions to the 
National Plan for Women, the National Plan against Racism 
and the Review of the National Anti-Poverty Strategy and for 
this research. It has also been shaped by information 
emerging from a series of project-based consultation 
processes, including its ongoing In from the Margin Project, 
funded under the Equality for Women measure, and a large-
scale participatory learning project, the Millennium Project 
which worked extensively with affiliates in 1999 and 2000.  
 
Issues raised in consultations have been reflected in 
submissions to various policy consultation processes over 
the years, especially those concerning the annual budgetary 
process, the Review of the National Anti-Poverty Strategy 
and the National Plan for Women. These are brought 
together in the equality framework outlined in the NWCI 
Strategic Plan (2002). The social welfare reform proposals 
are consistent with the equality framework’s key elements of 
redistribution, respect, recognition and representation (NESF, 
2002).  
 
Social insurance reform is a live and urgent issue for NWCI 
affiliates. Women are motivated to seek reform because of 
the practical issues emerging for women in the present model 
of welfare. These include economic dependence and related 
entrapment in domestic violence, incomplete access to PRSI 
coverage, lack of access to appropriate payments reflecting 
the reality of women’s lives, take-up and welfare-to-work 
issues and the bewildering complexity of entitlements. 
 
For NWCI members, the issue is also a matter of principle. 
Many women feel that the concept of adult dependency is a 
negative one that underpins ideologies of women’s inequality. 
Reform is important not only from a practical perspective but 
also because it can give financial and economic value to 
women’s contribution to family, social and economic life and 
so promote equality and respect for women’s work and 
contribution.  
From the NWCI perspective, social welfare reform is a tool to 
revise the value placed on the contributions of both women 
and men to family, society and the economy. This requires, 
amongst other things, a fair sharing of resources between 
women and men, the right to economic independence for all 
women and men and, above all, recognition of the economic 
contribution made by unpaid caring work.  
 
There is still substantial evidence that the Irish social welfare 
system facilitates and causes gender inequality in a male 
breadwinner model. Furthermore, there appears to be a level 
of complacency with this approach among many key players 
in the Irish policy-making system. Increasing the quantity and 
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quality of women’s participation in decision-making will be an 
important factor in making reform of social security a priority. 
We recommend the introduction of a social insurance board 
with adequate representation from gender equality interests, 
including the NWCI. 
 
To effect change in the policy-making system it is important 
that those assumptions either consciously or unconsciously 
informing the policy agenda of the policy-making system, 
should be made fully transparent. Training, awareness-
raising and public debate are all important ways of changing 
attitudes. It will be important therefore to ensure that this 
debate is not kept within the confines of the Social Insurance 
Working Group or any future social insurance board.  
 
The NWCI will seek to provide leadership in the debate to 
develop a vision of a reformed social welfare system that can 
promote women’s equality. The NWCI will ensure that this 
debate takes place not only within social partnership but also 
in the media and in appropriate Oireachtas committees, with 
the aim of getting a Government commitment to develop a 
Green Paper on independent entitlement for women. What it 
sees as crucial now is the acknowledgement of the need for 
reform and a commitment to the development of a system 
that, finally, promotes financial equality for women within the 
social welfare system.  
 
On behalf of the NWCI, I would like to acknowledge and 
appreciate Mary Murphy for her tireless work on this report 
and for her advice to our organization during the course of 
this research. I would like to thank the advisory group 
members for their guidance, and the Combat Poverty Agency 
and the NDP Gender Equality Unit of the Department of 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform for their valuable financial 
support. (Note: the views expressed in this report are not 
necessarily the views of Combat Poverty Agency). Finally, I 
wish to thank the NWCI staff members for their contributions 
to this report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gráinne Healy 
 
Chairwoman, National Women’s Council of Ireland  
April 2003 
 
A feminist policy alternative stresses support for both 
employment and care giving – both are seen as essential for 
social and political participation.  
 
“If society is not capable of harmonising motherhood with 
employment, we shall forego the most effective bulwark 
against child poverty. We shall additionally face very severe 
labour force shortages or alternatively a shortage of births. 
As women tend to be more educated than men we shall be 
wasting human capital. Gender equality is becoming the 
lynch pin of any positive post-industrial equilibrium.  
 
There is clearly a place for a new ‘women-friendly’ social 
contract because improving the situation for women will 
improve the collective welfare of society at large. The policy 
challenge boils down to two principle issues. Firstly, how to 
make parenthood compatible with a life dedicated to work 
and careers as well. This is usually identified as the question 
of women friendly policy. Secondly, how to create a new and 
more egalitarian equilibrium between men’s and women’s 
lives. The gender equality issue.” (Esping-Andersen, 2003). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Rationale for Model 
This research has forwarded a number of rationales to argue 
for a modernised social welfare system. It argues for reform 
from an equality and anti-poverty perspective and points to 
the need for reforms that enable outcomes which maximise 
the economic independence of women. The research 
concludes that social welfare reform is crucial and urgent and 
driven by the need: 
 
• To maximise the economic independence of women; •   
• To achieve a greater worklife balance and greater sharing 
of caring work;  
• To ensure that the social welfare system reflects patterns 
of women’s labour and market participation which are, in 
turn, influenced by the reality of care in family lives.  
 
 The challenge for a reform model is to strike the balance 
between accommodation of and respect for care and 
promotion of labour market equality in a context of high 
employment levels for both women and men. 
 
The social welfare modernisation model is a combined social 
insurance and social assistance model organised into four 
desired outcomes or central themes that, when combined, 
produce the outcomes in Box 1.  
 
Box 1: Outcomes from Model  
 
• Increased likelihood of women having independent 
income from employment or social welfare  
• Access to independent entitlement to pensions 
• Recognition of periodic gaps in labour market 
participation for parenting/caring  
• Accommodation of atypical forms of work, including part-
time work. 
 
Specific Recommendations  
The key unifying feature of the model is the need to increase 
the likelihood of women having independent entitlement to 
income via employment or social welfare. This should be 
done through the following short term and long term 
recommendations:  
 
Pensions: Provision for Older Women without Individual 
Pension Rights.  
 
• That the qualified adult allowance for all old-age pensions 
be increased to 100 per cent of the non-contributory old-
age pension (NCOAP) full adult rate and paid directly to 
the woman. By 2007 ensure that the qualified adult rate 
for the old-age pension (OAP) and NCOAP rises to 100 
per cent of the existing NCOAP rate.  
• That homemakers’ disregards be made retrospective from 
1973. This should be achieved by 2004.  
• That homemakers’ disregards be turned into 
homemakers’ credits. This should be be achieved by 
2004.  
• A gender impact assessment of Phase II of the Review of 
Contributions’ Qualifications recommendations should be 
undertaken. 
 
Developing Contingency for Parenting  
and Wage for Caring 
• Extension of maternity benefit from 18 weeks to 26 
weeks. This should be achieved by 2004.  
• Introduction of paid parental leave benefit for parents of 
young children. This should be achieved by 2004.  
• Introduction of part-time parental leave benefit for parents 
of children up to the age of 11.This should be done by 
2010.  
• Introduction of means-tested parental allowance by 2004.  
• Introduction of a means-tested part-time parental 
allowance by 2010.  
• Development of a mechanism to facilitate care of older  
and infirm people to be valued as paid work by 
consolidating carers’ benefit and carers’ allowance into a 
“wage”. This should be achieved by 2010.  
 
Recognising the Labour Market Reality  
of Atypical Women’s Employment  
• Introduction of a new part-time unemployment benefit  
and assistance for parents with children aged 0-12, so 
that parents seeking part-time work can have that part-
time unemployment recognised. This should be 
introduced by 2005.  
• Specific reforms of social insurance contribution rules to 
enable relatives assisting, including spouses of self-
employed / farmers, to be insured as employees. This 
should be introduced by 2005. 
• Rectification of means-testing anomalies by ensuring 
uniformity of earned income disregards, to be completed 
by 2004. 
 
Maximising Independent Entitlement  
• Structural reform in social insurance in relation to 
eligibility for credits by way of changing S57 SI 312 1996 
to enable a re-entry credit for homemakers re-entering the 
system. This should be done by 2004. 
• Structural reform of social assistance system through 
abolition of the limitation rule. This should be achieved by 
2004. 
• Increasing the likelihood of women having independent 
entitlement to income will require administrative changes 
and resources to enable sufficient investigation at claim 
stage, so each adult is exercising their full potential to be 
a claimant in their own right. It will also require clarity 
regarding eligibility requirements and consistency in 
regional application of guidelines determining eligibility for 
payments. It will also require a national information 
campaign aimed at women.  
 
• Reform is also needed in labour market policy and 
employment policy and especially in the practical world of 
work where legal rights to family-friendly work life need to 
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be developed and implemented. Further investment in 
childcare is also required. 
 
• The NWCI recommends that this report be examined by 
the Oireachtas Committee on Women’s Affairs and within 
the implementation structures of the National Plan for 
Women. Progress on reform in social welfare should be 
reported in the annual National Employment Action Plan 
under the objective of reforming tax and social welfare 
systems to facilitate access to employment.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The NWCI, the national representative organisation for 
women’s groups in Ireland, has 165 affiliated women’s 
organisations. The vision of the NWCI is the creation of a 
society in which all women and men can participate with 
equal effectiveness as full citizens and in which the 
independence of women is determined by right. 
 
1.1 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES:  
 MODERNISATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM  
The separate but related issues of modernisation of the 
social insurance system and access to independent income 
for women have long been topical. Most people accept that 
the primary route for independent income for women and 
men is through labour market participation. Equal right to 
work and equal pay for equal work have been important 
landmarks for gender equality. How the social welfare and 
labour markets facilitate and enable women’s participation in 
the labour market is crucial to ensuring maximum 
participation and maximum gender equality in the labour 
market. 
 
At the same time, for women who cannot work or who cannot 
find work, the debate about independent income for women 
must focus on the social welfare system. This system must 
be capable of distributing income to a woman at key stages 
of her life cycle when she is unable to provide her own 
income directly. This research is motivated by an awareness 
of a mismatch between the 21st century reality of women’s 
lives and women’s labour market participation and a 20th 
century social welfare system designed to cope with a 
radically different world.  
 
This research aims, from a rights, gender equality and anti-
poverty perspective, to develop a case for, and a model of 
reform of, social insurance and social assistance payments in 
Ireland. Building on work done elsewhere, the research aims 
to develop a framework that can be used to build a modern 
social welfare system capable of meeting the needs of 
women in Ireland in the 21st century.  
The scope of the research will be to:  
• Build a model to advance further reform of social 
insurance payments and social assistance payments; 
• Examine the practical implications of pursuing a 
social insurance-led reform model;  
• Assess both models from the perspective of 
considerations relating to cost, labour market and welfare-to-
work, care, equality and poverty; 
• Develop a strategy to ensure the implementation 
of this model over the next five budgets and into the longer 
term. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The research methodology was primarily desk-based 
research supplemented with interviews with a small number 
of statutory and academic social security experts. 
Recommendations were discussed with an expert advisory 
committee who met twice to comment on terms of reference 
and a draft report. The timeframe for the research was May 
to July 2002. 
 
Thanks are due to the participants on the advisory committee 
(who served on the committee solely in an advisory capacity 
and do not necessarily concur with the report’s conclusions 
or recommendations). This advisory committee comprised 
Carol Baxter, Laurence Bond, Claire Farrell, Eithne 
Fitzgerald, Anne-Marie McGauran, Anne McManus, Ita 
Mangan, Anne-Marie O’Connor and Orla O’Connor. The 
researcher would also like to thank Ursula Barry for advice, 
Eithne Fitzgerald for providing valuable information in 
Chapter 2 and the Department of Social and Family Affairs 
which assisted with costings. Thanks are also due to Combat 
Poverty Agency and National Development Plan Gender 
Equality Unit in the Department of Justice Equality and Law 
Reform who provided funding for this research. 
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT  
Chapter 1 outlines the research objectives, methodology and 
chapter outline.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews trends in women’s participation in the 
labour market.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces a gender perspective on the structure 
of the Irish social welfare system and the history of recent 
debate about social welfare reform in Ireland.  
 
Chapter 4 develops approaches to reform and advances a 
rationale for reform and principles to guide reform. 
 
Chapter 5 looks in depth at a framework towards enabling 
independent income for women. It focuses on reforms in both 
social insurance and social assistance and develops a 
framework to address practical issues in relation to gender 
equality. 
 
Chapter 6 reviews the practical implementation of the 
combined social insurance and social assistance system and 
puts these recommendations in a specific time scale.  
It reviews the caring and labour market implications  
of these recommendations and examines the 
recommendations from an equality and poverty perspective. 
It costs the proposals. 
 
Bibliography 
 
Appendices  
Review of Individualisation Debates 
Proposals for Reform that Influenced the NWCI Model 
Equality Assessment 
Changing Nature of the Labour Market 
Worklife Balance Scenarios 
“Social policy debate of the last decade has been about 
harmonising social benefits and labour markets” (O’Connor, 
1999). 
 
Developments in the Irish labour force over the last few years 
have been dominated by extremely rapid employment 
growth. The growth in female employment rates has been 
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both faster than men’s and different in character to male 
employment patterns.  
 
 
CHAPTER 2: WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET
2.1  FEATURES OF WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION  
  IN THE LABOUR MARKET 
This chapter discusses the following features of women’s 
labour market participation and concludes that, for reasons of 
efficiency and equity, the marked differences between 
women and men’s labour market require reforms of the social 
welfare system so that it better reflects and enables women’s 
labour market participation. The nature of the labour market 
is changing for women and men (see below) and there is 
evidence that: 
• Women’s participation is growing at a considerable pace 
and faster than that of men; 
• There is greater demand from women for part-time 
employment; 
• There is considerable movement in and out of the 
workforce for women, depending on the age of their 
children  
• There is considerable activity at the fringe of the labour 
market even for women who describe themselves as 
inactive; 
• Attachment to the social welfare system may influence 
the level of labour market activity for women.  
 
 
A vision of the future requires a modernisation and 
realignment of labour market, employment and social welfare 
policy. 
 
 
 
2.2  WOMEN’S INCREASING PARTICIPATION  
  IN THE LABOUR MARKET 
Women’s labour force participation (up to the age of 60) has 
been rising steadily over time from a low base. Increasing 
numbers of women now combine work (full or part-time) with 
raising a family and more women are returning to work when 
children are older. Almost half of women in their early 50s, 
and a third of women in their late 50s are now at work. This is 
not the case for older women, especially older single women 
who have an even higher rate of early retirement from the 
workforce than single men. Almost half of single women have 
retired before the age of 60. People with working spouses 
(except where the spouse was on a high income) and people 
with dependent children were more likely to continue at work 
(Quinn et al., 1998).  
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Comparing internationally, the National Economic and Social 
Forum (NESF, 2000) noted that the female employment rate 
varied widely across Europe from 71.65 per cent in Denmark 
to 37.3 per cent in Spain. Ireland, with a 1999 female 
employment rate of 51.54 per cent, ranked 10th in the EU 
and was close to the EU average of 52.6 per cent (EU 
Labour Force Survey 1999, Eurostat 2000). From an 
economic and competitiveness perspective, it is worth noting 
that US female participation rates are 67 per cent. Overall 
percentages mask considerable age differentiation - Ireland 
rates sixth in the EU for participation rates of younger 
women. The NESF concluded that that there was potential to 
expand the workforce by increasing employment participation 
particularly among middle-age and older women and also 
noted that specific tax and/or welfare provisions may 
reinforce the lower participation rates of prime age and older 
women.  
 
This increased labour market participation means that more 
women are paying PRSI and building up social insurance 
contributions. If women are to extract full value from these 
contributions, however, the social insurance system must 
reflect more accurately the life contingencies that effectively 
interrupt a woman’s labour market participation at key stages 
in her life cycle.  
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Figure 2: 
WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION BY BIRTH COHORT  
 
Table A.3 
Percentage Labour Force Participation Rates for Women, by Birth Cohort 
(Reading across the table shows participation rates by the same cohort at successive ages.  
Reading down shows how participation rates at a given age range have changed for successive cohorts) 
 
Born in/age 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74  
 
1887-91           15.0  
1892-6          18.9 13.0  
1897-1901         22.1 17.2 10.9  
1902-6     20.3   23.0 21.2 15.9 
1907-11    22.1   22.0  22.4  20.7  10.4  4.8  
1912-16     26.8     20.1  20.8  21.8  18.4  8.2  3.5  
1917-22   41.7   19.2  19.7  21.5  21.1  17.3 6.4  3.6  
1922-27 60.8    19.1  17.9  20.1  23.0  21.5  16.5  6.6 
1927-31     24.0  19.0  19.3  22.6  23.7  21.8  16.2 
1932-36   38.7  22.2  18.9  22.1  24.4  25.2  24.5  15.9 
1937-41  67.2  35.6  21.6  18.5  24.1  26.6  29.8  27.9  19.9 
1942-46  66.8  34.7  23.7  22.9  26.2  33.2  35.8  34.9 
1947-51  65.5  38.4  26.8  27.4  35.1  41.2  47.0 
1952-56  69.0  45.4  37.3  41.1  47.1  58.3 
1957-61  70.9  59.0  53.3  53.9  63.4 
1962-66  76.7  71.1  61.9  64.5 
1967-71  75.6  76.2  70.1 
1972-76  66.9  80.3 
1977-81  60.9 
Sources: Censuses 1961-96, Labour Force Survey 1975, QNHS 2001; all principal economic status 
 
 
2.3 MANY WOMEN ACTIVELY CHOOSE PART-TIME 
WORK 
Figure 1 above and figure 4 below illustrates that a 
substantial number of women are in part-time employment. 
The band, “in employment, part-time, not underemployed” 
illustrates the category of voluntary part-time labour market 
participation. This characterises a significant percentage of 
female labour market participation and differentiates male 
and female employment patterns. Quarterly National 
Household Survey (QNHS) figures show that 28 per cent of 
those in the labour force are in part-time employment, with 
women accounting for over 80 per cent of part-time workers. 
Most part-time employed females do not describe themselves 
as underemployed. One-third of unemployed females state 
that they are seeking part-time work. In general, the reason 
that women choose part-time employment is because of their 
caring responsibilities, especially in a context where childcare 
remains both expensive and scarce.  
 
Part-time work is closely correlated with the age of school-
going children (rather than young babies). Women have 
different work patterns to men. Consequently, a social 
welfare system that cannot accommodate part-time work-life 
patterns clearly cannot accommodate all women. This is 
important in the context of labour market policy. Women with 
older children are more likely to enter or re-enter the 
workforce when they can work part time. Providing greater 
recognition of part-time work in the social welfare system, 
therefore, is likely to attract more women into the labour 
force, a key requirement for international competitiveness.  
 
Figure 3: 
BREAKDOWN OF LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION  
OF WOMEN AND MEN  
 
Employment Status   Men   Women  
In full time employment   84.7   64.7  
 
In part-time employment  
but not underemployed   6.6   27.2  
 
In part-time employment  
but underemployed   0.6   0.7  
 
Unemployed and seeking  
full time employment   7.7   4.6  
 
Unemployed and seeking  
part-time employment   0.3   2.8   
 
   100   100  
 
Source CSO, QNHS in Women’s Access to the Labour 
Market (DSCFA 2001) 
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2.4 TRENDS IN PARTICIPATION ARE CLOSELY 
RELATED TO AGE AND NEEDS OF CHILDREN  
 
Women’s participation in the labour market is complex and 
closely related to age of children and related childcare needs 
but not necessarily correlated with children’s youngest 
stages. There are more women in full-time work when the 
child is aged one-two years than two-four years. This is likely 
to be due to a combination of births of second children and 
the childcare needs of the first child becoming more complex. 
There is also evidence of a trend in part-time work when 
children become teenagers. The life choices of women vary 
over the life cycle of their parenting. Women are likely to 
move from full-time care of young children in their home to 
some form of labour market participation and then to part-
time or full-time work. The pace of movement will differ 
depending on various factors such as number of children, 
age of children, spaces between children, availability of part-
time and full-time jobs and other labour market opportunities 
and availability of quality and affordable childcare. The social 
welfare system has to reflect this “non typical” flexible and 
adaptable pattern of labour market activity.
 
Figure 4: 
PARTICIPATION BY AGE OF CHILDREN   
 
Participation Rates of Women, 2001 and 1996  
by Age of Youngest Child 
 
Participation Rates of Women, 2001 and 1996  
compared by Age of Youngest Child 
 
0
u5
5-14
all 15+
Couple 2001
u5
5-14
all 15+
Lone Parents 2001
0-2
2-4
5-9
10-14
Lone Parents 2001
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0
u5 2001
0-2 1996
2-4 1996
Couple
5-14 2001
10-14 1996
all 15+ 2001
10 20 30 40 50 60 70  
 
Full-Time       Part-Time 
 
QNHS Mar-May 2001 Special tabulation 
Figure 5:   
EXIT RATES FROM LABOUR FORCE OF WOMEN  
 
Percentage five-year exit rates from labour force of women employed in previous period  (Minus indicates exit)  
Exit years/exit age 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74  
 
1961-66   -47.0  -42.6  -20.8  -6.3  2.6  3.5  1.8  -7.8  -22.2  -31.2  
 
1966-71   -48.1  -39.3  -14.9  1.6  12.3  9.1  4.8  -7.6  -25.0  -36.6  
 
1971-75   -51.7  -39.6  -17.9  21.2  21.4  18.0  -2.3  -19.5  -62.2  n.a.  
 
1975-81   -28.5  -25.2  -2.8  25.2  8.7  4.1  -5.4  -15.0  -46.2  -44.9 
 
1981-86   -16.8  -17.8  2.2  14.4  10.4  3.3  -8.0  -23.3  -63.0  -57.3  
 
1986-91   -7.3  -9.7  10.2  28.1  26.7  12.0  -2.8  -25.7  -60.0  -43.8  
 
1991-96   0.8  -12.9  1.1  14.6  17.4  7.8  -6.4  -35.1  n.a.  n.a.  
 
1996-2001  20.0  -8.0  4.2  17.6  23.8  14.1  -2.5  -28.6  n.a.  n.a.  
 
Note: The figures for 1971-75, and 1975-81 have been rescaled to their five-year equivalents 
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2.5  WOMEN RETURNERS DEMONSTRATE  
  CONSIDERABLE LABOUR MARKET ACTIVITY  
Recent research (ESRI, 2002) reviewed the experience of 
Irish women in “home duties” and confirms both active and 
passive labour market interest. In 2000 the QNHS recorded 
531,000 women officially designated as on home duties in 
Ireland. The number of women recording themselves as on 
home duties dropped by 50,000 over the period 1994-2000. 
This reflected a drop from 43.3 per cent in home duties in 
1994 to 34.8 per cent in 2000.  
 
This may be an overestimate as many women define 
themselves in home duties when marginal attachment may 
be a more accurate reflection of their labour force status. The 
ESRI found that a number in home duties wished to return to 
some type of paid employment and / or to engage in some 
form of education, training or labour market activity. Indeed, it 
is striking that in undertaking the research, the ESRI found it 
difficult to source women who had absolutely no attachment 
to the labour force. This led the researchers to conclude 
“there is evidence that women returners are often reluctant to 
declare that they are searching for employment but may 
nevertheless seize an opportunity when it is offered to them”.  
 
Women returners expressed a preference for part-time work 
in order to combine caring responsibilities with paid 
employment. Part-time work was the return route for 71 per 
cent of women returners and many cited that flexible hours 
was the most important criterion determining their job 
choices. In reality, many women traded flexible hours against 
pay and most ended up in low-paid jobs and lower status 
jobs than their previous employment.  
 
Up to 90 per cent of women in the home have previous 
labour market experience. The length of time women are 
spending outside of the labour force is now declining. This is 
important, given the finding that the longer a women spends 
out of the workforce, the weaker her chances of making a 
successful transition to paid employment. This also means 
that most women have already, or will have, an increasing 
link to the social insurance system.  
 
2.6  ACCESS TO THE SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM  
  MAY CORRELATE WITH LABOUR  
  MARKETACTIVITY 
The ESRI (2002) found that attachment to the social welfare 
system appeared to be a strong influence in labour market 
participation. Almost 73 per cent of the women returners 
identified as “active in the labour market” were either directly 
or indirectly attached to the social welfare system and had 
access to a number of labour market supports. It follows that 
increasing the number of women with independent 
entitlement to the labour market may also directly and 
indirectly increase labour force participation of these women, 
either directly because they are obliged to work or have 
access to labour market supports or indirectly because they 
are exposed to information and may see themselves 
differently.  
 
The same study (ESRI, 2002) concluded that almost 70 per 
cent of the broader number of women returners in their study 
had no direct attachment to the social welfare system. The 
remaining 30 per cent were recipients of unemployment, 
disability, survivor’s and one-parent family payments. The 
type of payment influenced the likelihood of women seeking 
work as some payments require job search activity or act as 
a gateway to education, training and labour market 
programmes. Of those 70 per cent of women not directly 
attached to the social welfare system, up to a quarter of the 
women had a partner “not at work”. A significant percentage 
of these may have been qualified adults; for example their 
partner or spouse was receiving a social welfare payment. 
The woman as a qualified adult on her partner’s claim may 
have had access to labour market supports. Making her 
attachment to the social welfare and labour market system 
more visible may well increase her likelihood of returning to 
work. 
 
2.7  WOMEN’S LABOUR MARKET EXPERIENCE 
  - A CONTINUUM OF ACTIVITY  
It is clear that women’s labour market activity is a continuum 
of activity (ESRI, 2002). There is often gradual transition from 
no desire to participate in paid employment to full time work. 
Women can move from full time care to combine part-time 
care/part-time work, and then move to full time work. In 
reality, women travel backwards and forwards along this 
continuum. This flexibility and adaptability should be 
regarded as a key asset in competitiveness and should be 
facilitated and encouraged. “The primacy of the labour 
market is the hall mark of liberal policy regimes but reliance 
on the labour market for survival does not take place 
independent of relations of caring and dependence within 
households.” (O’Connor, 1999). 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION  
This increased participation of women in the labour market 
has made a significant contribution to the economic growth 
that Ireland has experienced. Current policy is to increase the 
numbers of women returners re-entering the labour market 
and FÁS has recently launched its Expanding the Workforce 
Initiative, a pilot programme for women returners. The 
National Economic and Social Council (2002) and the annual 
National Employment Action Plan1 (2002) are clear that 
economic growth requires policies that achieve maximum 
efficiency in the labour market and that increase women’s 
participation in the labour market. This goal is reflected in 
both Irish and EU employment policy as outlined in NEAP 
2002 which sets a target of 60% for women’s employment 
rate. This means that the social welfare system, if it is to best 
enable women’s participation, should reflect the reality of 
women’s labour market participation in the social welfare and 
labour market infrastructure. The following are important 
realities and desired features:  
• When women are independent players in the social 
welfare system they are more likely to view themselves as 
potential labour market participants; 
                                                 
1
The National Employment Action Plan is an annual process, whereby under 
the European Union employment guidelines for open co-ordination of 
employment policy, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment co-
ordinate an annual report to the European Union. 
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• The need to accommodate the right to a paid period of 
parental leave in both social insurance and social 
assistance schemes;  
• Maximising capacity of both parents to use parental 
leave, for example enabling paid parental leave to be 
used over a longer period; 
• Extension of maternity and parental leave to best practice 
in Europe, for example to an equivalence with Norway 
and Sweden who grant a year’s paid leave after birth; 
• Statutory recognition of parents’ right to work part-time. 
Part-time work needs to be better accommodated as a 
clear feature of women’s participation in the labour 
market; 
• Resolution of the many anomalies and obstacles related 
to accommodation of atypical work in the social welfare 
system; 
• Increased access to pension eligibility for women, so that 
women have greater incentive and reward from returning 
to work and can extract due credit for previous labour 
market participation; 
• Increased length of paid maternity and adoptive leave. 
 
Any model being developed must accommodate the reality of 
women on a transition from care to labour market 
participation, often in a part-time capacity. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE IRISH SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM 
 
3.1 The welfare state  
While many definitions of the welfare state exist, the term is 
generally used to refer to the public mechanisms of support 
(in cash, in kind, or through public services) against a 
catalogue of social risks including old-age, death of a 
supporting partner, invalidity, sickness, maternity, 
unemployment (Ferrera, 1997). The structure of income 
support and the related social welfare system in any country 
reflects the dominant political ideology at its time of formation 
and the ideologies that have influenced subsequent reform 
and development. Redistribution, particularly over the life 
cycle, is the dominant function of the welfare state.  
 
Welfare states differ in the degree to which they intervene, 
redistribute, cost and require high or low levels of taxation. 
Social welfare systems differ in the degree to which they rely 
on different payment systems to deliver payments or 
transfers to people. The main categories of Irish transfers 
(outlined below) are: insurance, assistance and universal. 
Before describing these, it is worth locating the Irish social 
welfare model in an international context.  
 
3.2 SOCIAL WELFARE 
 AND LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONALITY  
Social welfare systems differ to the degree to which the 
conditions attached to payment require labour market 
participation (also known as labour market conditionality). 
Ireland has been classified as average in relation to the 
degree of labour market conditionality it requires of welfare 
recipients (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This is increasing over 
time as “welfare to work” strategies become more dominant, 
reflecting the ideology that a job is the best route out of 
poverty. The focus on a requirement of labour market 
attachment is a key consideration in the degree to which a 
social welfare system includes women. For example, if 
qualification for an unemployment payment requires a person 
to prove availability for full-time work (as is the case in 
Ireland), it will be harder for women with care responsibilities 
to prove full-time eligibility. In practice, some women are 
denied an unemployment payment because they are not 
available for full-time work although they are available for, 
willing to undertake, and are actually seeking part-time work.  
 
Different welfare regimes require different levels of proof 
about the degree to which a person is genuinely and actively 
seeking work. In the Irish context, for example, a person has 
to prove that she has immediate provision of childcare in the 
event of a job offer. This is likely to deter more women than 
men from seeking unemployment payments. There is 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that more women than men 
are asked to prove child-minding arrangements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 A Gender Perspective of Social Welfare Systems  
Welfare systems also differ according to whether they focus 
on the family or the individual as a basis for assessing and 
paying income support. A useful theoretical model through 
which to understand the welfare system is the male 
breadwinner model (Lewis, 1993). This model is based on 
the premise that the social welfare system is built on the 
tradition of the male as family breadwinner and the female as 
carer or homemaker. The model suggests that states built 
their wages’ policy, tax and welfare systems around a 
prototype family of a fully employed male earning a family 
wage and supporting a dependent spouse and children in a 
lifelong stable marriage.2
 
The male breadwinner model in social welfare means that 
traditionally women have had derived rights through their 
husbands’ social insurance records. This extends to women 
being defined and named in relation to their husbands even 
when the husband is not present, for instance prisoners’ 
wives allowances and deserted wives’ benefit, widows’ 
payments. Where women do have individual rights to social 
welfare, it is often in the context of their role as carers or 
mothers such as, for example the one-parent allowance 
payment. These carers’ payments are still within the context 
of a male breadwinner model of social welfare regime where 
the woman is defined in terms of the status of her relationship 
with her husband. In such a model there are three types of 
payment:  
 
• Direct rights acquired by an individual on the basis of 
residency and satisfying some type of contingency;  
 
• Direct rights acquired by individuals on the basis of 
contributions and satisfying some type of contingency 
for which they have paid into the social security 
system; 
 
• Derived rights acquired by individuals on the basis of 
their relationship to someone who has acquired direct 
rights and when they satisfy some type of 
contingency.  
 
                                                 
2  It is worth noting that the concept of the male breadwinner was explicitly 
acknowledged in higher rates of pay for men than women doing the same jobs. 
This male breadwinner wages’ policy was eradicated in the Equal Pay 
legislation (1977). This effectively ended and made illegal the notion that men 
deserved or needed higher wages because they were the breadwinners. The 
legislation affirmed individual rights to equal pay for women and men. While a 
gender pay gap still exists, it is not there primarily because men are considered 
breadwinners rather because of women’s shorter time in the labour market, job 
segregation and the glass ceiling. 
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3.3.1 A Breadwinner Model  
Several different models of reform can be isolated from the experience of recent international reform. Different states are moving 
farther away from the breadwinner model than others. Lewis (1993) distinguishes policies that promote women as workers and 
those that promote women as mothers/carers.  
 
Figure 9: 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF WELFARE MODELS 
 
Male Breadwinner Emphasis  Weak Modified  Strong   
 
Country  Sweden  France  Ireland, UK, Germany   
 
Labour market participation  High  Medium  Low   
 
Social welfare  Individualised tax & Child-focused Family-based tax  
 social welfare redistribution  and social welfare   
 
Childcare  Strong intervention Strong intervention &  Undeveloped care & 
 parental leave mothers’ employment rights infrastructure and limited  
   maternity leave  
 
Ethos for women Labour market Neutral Homemakers   
 
 
Tamara (1996) makes the point that the extent to which the 
male breadwinner model dominates will be an important 
factor in delivering reform. Reform can seek to move away 
from the male breadwinner model towards a model that sees 
income generation as a more gender-neutral concept and 
places more emphasis on women as workers. Reform can 
stay within a male breadwinner model and place a larger 
emphasis on recognition and facilitation of the care role. 
Alternatively, reform can try to accommodate a pro-woman 
model of care and work, where a balance is struck between 
enabling the reality of care and equality of participation in 
paid employment for women and men.  
 
3.4 OVERVIEW OF IRISH SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM 
 
3.4.1 Social Insurance 
A key element of social insurance is the principle that the 
individual, by making contributions, is building up a set of 
entitlements to benefits. This is the “contributory” principle 
which establishes a linkage between raising revenue 
(contributions) and expenditure (benefits). Entitlement to 
social insurance benefit is based on a record of social 
insurance contributions and depends on the occurrence of 
certain contingencies related to loss of employment, for 
example unemployment, disability, old-age. Contributions are 
made to the social insurance fund from gross earnings of 
employees and self-employed people and employers. Once 
contribution conditions are satisfied, all claimants, regardless 
of marital status, household situation or means, receive the 
payment. Payments are normally flat rate, with additions paid 
for adult and child dependants.  
 
When a prescribed contingency occurs, the social insurance 
system gives benefits as of right, based on a record of social 
insurance contributions. Initiatives in recent years have 
resulted in the extension of the social insurance system to 
groups not previously covered: the self-employed (1988), 
part-time workers (1991), homemakers (1994), civil servants 
(1995) and carers (2000). The employment-related nature of 
the social insurance system, however, necessarily 
discriminates against those who do not or cannot participate 
in waged labour, or participate only intermittently. The main 
gaps in coverage, identified by the Department of Social 
Welfare in 1996, were people working full time as 
homemakers, relatives assisting and atypical workers.  
 
3.4.2 Social Assistance 
Social assistance payments, on the other hand, are based on 
need as established by a household means test and 
designed for those who fail to satisfy the contributory 
conditions governing social insurance payments. The level of 
assistance payable is affected by the claimant’s household 
situation. The full rate is paid where there is no other 
assessable income in the household (subject to rules 
governing disregarded income), and assistance is reduced 
according to income received. As with social insurance 
benefits, payments are only made when certain 
contingencies can be proved, such as unemployment, old-
age, or illness. While these originally tended to be related to 
loss of employment, other contingencies now included are 
persons parenting alone and those caring for an 
incapacitated person. As is the case with social insurance 
benefits, payments are flat rate with allowances for 
dependants (adult and children). There is a residual social 
assistance payment, supplementary welfare allowance, 
payable to persons whose means are insufficient to meet 
their needs. There are also means-tested secondary benefits 
in areas of health (medical card) and housing (rent and 
mortgage allowance). There is also an in-work payment 
known as family income supplement, which is payable to 
families whose income falls below certain income limits. 
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3.4.3 Universal Payments  
Accompanying these social insurance and social assistance payments is the universal child support payment, child benefit. This is 
payable to all families with dependent children regardless of contribution record or household income. There are a range of non-
cash universal benefits such as the medical card, free electricity and free travel which are administered on the basis of old-age 
and/or living alone. 
 
Figure 10:  
SOCIAL INSURANCE AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER  
 
 Social Insurance  Social Insurance Social Assistance    Social Assistance  Total   Total  
 
Male  219,358   46.2%   196,820   45.9%   416,178 46.1% 
 
Female  255,083   53.8%   232,114   54.1%   487,197 53.9% 
 
While women appear to be the majority of claimants, there is clear gender differentiation in payment type (see figure 11). It is worth 
noting that there is no data to analyse the gender distribution of income. So we cannot assume that, because women make up the 
majority of claims, they get the majority of expenditure. Approximately 125,000 of the male claimants will include claims involving 
qualified adults so, on average, the male claim will involve higher expenditure per claim.  
 
Figure 11: 
INDIVIDUAL PAYMENTS DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER  
 
Payment Number of men Number of women No. of qualified  
      adult allowances   
 
Old-age pension 60,477 34,394   23,329  
Retirement pension 58,971 21,355   24,142  
Non-contributory old-age pension  37,826  51,235   4,449      
Pre-retirement allowance  9,521  2,286    4,372  
Widow’s contributory pension  10,095  91,172    – 
Widow’s non-contributory pension  223  16,588    – 
One-parent payment 1,959 75,183   – 
Unemployment payment  80,737  45,710   7,810 (UB)   
      15,178 (UA) 
Supplementary welfare allowance  17,822  11,345   6,785  
Back-to-work allowance – enterprise  2,914  794    10,838  
Back-to-work allowance – employment  21,868  6,615    1,595       
Back-to-education allowance  2,127  1,974   295  
Farm assist  7,806  574    4,093  
Disability benefit  19,378  31,337   7,443       
Invalidity pension  27,843  22,772   11,117      
Carer’s benefit  57   368     – 
Carer’s allowance  3,760  15,025   – 
Blind pension  1,053  1,072    144  
Disability allowance  34,458  23,197   4,732  
Injury benefit  637  224     148 
Interim disability benefit   333  116     57 
Death benefit  4   672     – 
Disablement benefit  9,289  1,941     227 
Total  409,158  455,949   126,754  
 
Source DSCFA (2001). Shaded rows indicate payments where more women receive the payment than men. This shows women are 
predominantly receiving caring payments in their own right. 
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3.5  IRISH PAYMENT STRUCTURE  
While, on the surface, the impact of equality legislation 
means the structure of the social welfare system is 
essentially gender neutral, the legacy of the male 
breadwinner system and the culture of social welfare in 
Ireland mean the payment structures present practical 
problems for women who make up over 95 per cent of 
qualified adults.  
 
3.5.1 QUALIFIED ADULTS 
The payment structure enables adult claimants to have 
financial responsibility for “dependants”, both adults and 
children. An adult depending on a claimant is called a 
qualified adult (QA). The payment made to the claimant in 
respect of the qualified adult is called a qualified adult 
allowance (QAA).  
 
A claimant is deemed eligible to claim for a qualified adult 
allowance if that adult has no social welfare payment in their 
own right and is earning less than €88.80 per week (2002) 
gross income from employment or elsewhere. A tapered 
reduced rate payment can be claimed when a qualified adult 
earns more than this amount (up to a maximum gross of 
€196.81 per week). A claimant who can claim a QA receives 
the adult rate (normally 0.7 of the adult rate in 2002 but 
higher for pensioners). The 2002 Programme for Government 
made the following commitment: “We will introduce a 
personal pension entitlement for pensioner spouses currently 
in receipt of the QAA set at the level of the full non-
contributory pension”. This is in effect a commitment to 
increase all pension QAAs to 100 per cent of the non-
contributory old-age pension (NCOAP). 
 
A spouse can apply to the Department of Social and Family 
Affairs to have this payment administered and paid directly to 
the qualified adult. This is done in 1,500 cases, usually as a 
response to problems about internal household  distribution 
of income. There have been proposals to make division of 
the payment a feature of the social welfare payment system. 
This is called administrative individualisation. Even if 
Government were to decide to administratively individualise 
the payments, the payment would still be a derived right and 
the person now considered as a qualified adult would still not 
have an individual entitlement to income. 3
3.5.2 EQUIVALENT RATES  
The Irish social welfare system is based on a principle of 
economies of scale where it is assumed that households will 
                                                 
                                                
3 The most recent forum of debate was the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness working 
group “to produce proposals to progress the implementation of administrative 
individualisation within the social welfare system” which finished its deliberation in February 
2002 but has not yet published its findings. The group recommended that administrative 
individualisation should be proceeded with, but could not agree on whether this should be 
mandatory or voluntary and how the total payment should be split between the two adults. 
There was, however, consensus in the group that individualisation was best forwarded 
through the social insurance system.  Responding to the report, then Minister Ahern stated 
that it was timely to consider whether the current title of qualified adult remained appropriate 
in the light of the trend towards greater individualisation. He highlighted a key priority to 
facilitate homemakers to qualify for pensions and to increase the QA in pension payments to 
the full old-age pension rate and in this way achieve a form of individualisation of pensions 
(DSFCA PR 10-02-2002). Since then, Ms. Mary Coughlan T.D., Minister for Social and 
Family Affairs, has clarified that from October 1st 2002, qualified spouses and partners of 
people entitled to a retirement or an old-age (contributory) pension from the Department of 
Social and Family Affairs, will be given a choice of having their part of the payment paid 
directly to them.  The new facility would be offered to new claimants of contributory old-age 
and retirement pensions from October 1st next and would be extended over time. "This is 
the way ahead for the administration of payments by my Department. It is important that we 
offer our customers this option. It gives the choice of payment option which suits them best,” 
the Minister said. 
have reduced living expenses on the basis of shared 
economies. This means that two adult households receive 
1.7 times the personal rate with 1 being the adult rate and 0.7 
being the qualified adult rate. The percentage of the adult 
rate paid for the qualified adult is called the equivalence rate. 
This rate is essentially an arbitrary political choice but is 
influenced by research on economies of scale in joint 
households. In the Review of the National Anti-Poverty 
Strategy (2002), it was agreed that the child equivalence 
scale should be 33-35 per cent of the lowest adult payment. 
The Programme for Prosperity and Fairness committed to 
increasing the QAA for non-pensions social welfare 
payments to 0.7. The 2002 Programme for Government 
committed to increasing old-age pensions QAAs to 100 per 
cent of equivalence of the NCOAP. 
 
This concept is disputed in principle and in practice by 
Fitzgerald (1993) who has pointed to the practical issue 
determining whether economies of scale exist and the 
difficulty in determining what the economies are. She shows 
how economies are inconsistent across households. Rent, 
fuel and utility bills are the only areas in which economies of 
scale are likely to be achieved and these were already 
accounted for in fuel and housing allowances. Even if the 
principle of economies of scale was abolished and QAA 
equivalence were increased to 100 per cent, this would not 
fulfil the criteria of economic independence. The right to the 
income would still be held by the adult claimant and the 
qualified adult’s right to a payment would still be derived from 
that of the adult claimant.  
 
3.5.3 LIMITATION RULE  
In households where both adults have eligibility for a social 
assistance payment in their own right (for example both are 
unemployed) the total payment to the household is reduced 
to 1.7 times the rate of two adult payments. This is referred to 
as the limitation rule. In practice, the limitation rule means 
there is no direct financial incentive for both adults to prove 
eligibility for a payment. This limitation rule has led to a 
greater number of women being classed as adult dependants 
and not declaring their own specific eligibility for a social 
welfare payment. (This rule does not operate where both 
adults in the household are separately eligible for disability 
allowances or for old-age pensions, in which cases both 
adults will receive a full adult payment of the relevant 
payment.) The limitation rule also affects lone parents 
considering living with or marrying an unemployed man.4 
This rule is discussed further in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4 The structure of qualified adult payment is recognised as a potential poverty 
trap for lone parents, of whom there were 73,282 in 2001 receiving one-parent 
allowance (over 80 per cent of them were women.) Lone parents moving into a 
cohabiting relationship with an unemployed or otherwise social welfare 
dependent man would have to lose financial independence and suffer a 
financial loss by seeing income total for the couple fall from 2 to 1.7 (with an 
additional small loss for the child dependant allowance payment) (NESF, 2001; 
DSCFA, 2000). 
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3.5.4 Means Testing of Spouses’ Earnings  
An unemployed person married to or living with an employed 
person can apply for unemployment assistance. They will be 
subject to a household means test or they will receive 
unemployment benefit (subject to them having the 
appropriate paid and credited contributions). In the following 
example we assume Mary is married to Declan and Declan is 
earning €350 net per week. They have two children, Emer 
and Dan, both under 18 and dependent on the family.  
 
Declan’s net wages   €350 
Less income disregard   €88.88 
Assessable income    €261.12 
50 per cent assessable income  €130.56 
 
This €130.56 is taken from Mary’s potential social assistance 
payment of €135.60 (made up of the personal rate of €118.80 
and half child dependant allowance rates of €8.40 x 2). Mary 
would receive a social assistance payment of €5.04 per 
week. 
 
The household means test results in a person (with no 
dependent children) with a spouse or partner earning over 
€252.68 gross per week receiving no unemployment 
assistance5. If the woman is entitled even to nominal 
unemployment assistance, she will be eligible for 
participation in all labour market measures that have live 
register eligibility requirements. If she does not receive a 
financial payment she can, if eligible, sign on for credits. 
Since a joint Irish National Organisation of the 
Unemployed/NWCI Breaking the Barriers campaign in 1998 
awareness-raising initiatives have been undertaken to inform 
women of their right to sign on “in their own right”. It is likely, 
however, that there is still a relatively low level of awareness 
and a related low take-up by women who may be eligible to 
“sign-on”.  
 
3.5.5 Means Testing the Qualified Adult’s Income  
 from Part-Time Earnings  
The following means test is a useful illustration of the 
complexity of the social welfare system from the perspective 
of low-income women who are qualified adults. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The example given is of a woman with no dependent children. If a woman 
has dependent children the amount of earnings a spouse can earn before the 
woman has no entitlement to a UA payment will increase by €16.76 per 
dependent child. 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  
MEANS TESTING OF QUALIFIED ADULT’S EARNINGS  
 
Liz is married to Tom and they have two children. She works 
three days per week for €153.84 gross.  
 
Tom’s full rate unemployment assistance is €231.20 (made 
up of one adult rate at €118.80, one qualified adult rate at 
€78.80 and two child dependant payments of €33.60). Tom’s 
UA is reduced by €100.60 (due to the various means tests for 
Liz’s earnings) to €131.10.  
 
The family are €53.24 better off from Liz’s work. Three 
different means tests have been applied to Liz’s earnings. It 
is worth noting that the household income will be further 
reduced when the local authority differential rent means test 
is applied. Secondary benefits such as the fuel allowance, 
the medical card and back-to school footwear and clothing 
allowances may also be affected.  
 
1. Child Dependant Allowance (CDA) Means Test 
Budget 2000 changes mean that since April 2000 the full rate 
of child dependant allowance can be retained until the 
qualified adult’s earnings are more than €196.81 gross. In 
this instance, Tom will retain the full rate of child dependant 
allowances. 
 
 
2 Tapered Qualified Adult Means Test 
Since April 2000, the new definition of qualified adult is 
€88.88 gross per week (previously £60 gross) for all means-
tested and benefit-based payments. Loss of this qualified 
adult payment is tapered up to €196.81 per week gross.  
 
Liz’s qualified adult payment is reduced through this means 
test from the full rate of €78.80 to €33.20. Tom’s UA is 
reduced by the difference (€45.60) to €186.60.  
 
 
3 Means Test of Earnings Against  
 Total Social Welfare Payment  
Liz is allowed an income disregard against her earnings 
before her earnings are taken into account in the household 
means test that determines Tom’s unemployment payment. 
She works 24 hours and is allowed a three-day income 
disregard of €38.09 and an additional €6.35 travel expenses 
disregard. Her remaining earnings are withdrawn at a rate of 
50 cents in the euro from the claimant’s unemployment 
assistance.  
 
Net earnings    €153.84 
Minus (income and travel disregard) €44.44 
     €109.40 
Earnings assessed at 50 per cent €54.70 
 
Tom’s new UA (€231.20- €45.60) €186.60 is further reduced 
by €54.70 to a total UA of €131.10 
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3.5.6 Conclusion  
The previous chapter reflected on the need to modernise the 
Irish social welfare system from the perspective of 
maximising women’s participation in the labour market and 
argued that features of women’s labour market participation 
need to be reflected more comprehensively in social welfare, 
labour market and employment policy and practice.  
 
This chapter’s focus on the design of the social welfare 
system illustrates how the design and interaction of the 
different earnings means tests can increase the likelihood of 
poverty and inequality. This is especially problematic from the 
perspective of the qualified adult. Women and men report 
that the impact and interaction between all these household 
means tests are not fully understood by welfare claimants 
making labour market and family formation decisions. This 
can cause household tensions (NESF, 2001; SIPTU, 2000).  
 
There are also inequities in the way earned income is 
assessed within the household and across different 
households. There are different types and levels of income 
disregards for qualified adults, main claimants, lone parents 
and people with disabilities. For comparison purposes a lone 
parent is allowed to disregard €7,618.43 per year or €146.51 
per week before earnings affect the social welfare payment 
total. This raises larger gender and horizontal equality issues 
(NESF, 2001). It is also worth noting that there are 
inconsistencies in the type of income disregards that operate 
in the tax system which are generally more generous. A 
woman with the home carer tax credit is allowed to disregard 
the first €5,000 earned income before the tax credit is 
affected.  
 
The four features of the payment structure discussed above 
are features resulting from a family-based system using 
household means-testing. While gender neutral in theory, in 
practice they have a negative impact on more women than 
men. There are one quarter of a million women (127,000 
qualified adults, 80,000 lone parents and up to 50,000 in 
employed low-income families) who can, in theory, be 
affected. These are the fault lines of the male breadwinner 
system of household means-testing.  
 
Rottmann (1994) concluded that separate incomes for wives 
were important for their own well-being and that of their 
children. Women’s earnings or income directly received give 
women greater control over how that money is used. 
Rottmann (1994) concluded that the presence of gender 
inequality was not in dispute: “it is manifest in the division 
between husbands and wives, of spending responsibilities, 
the power to make major financial decisions and in the 
various measures of access to leisure and personal 
spending.” Rottmann concluded that the research had 
implications for the payment of social welfare benefits as 
direct payments in a married woman’s own right rather than 
as a dependant of their husband.  
This would suggest a need for a model of social welfare 
reform that promotes economic independence of women 
within the social welfare code and that enables individual 
(non derived) rights to social welfare. A rights approach 
recognises that economic independence within the family is 
an essential precursor to realising full citizenship rights for 
women in society. This definition reflects the work of Lister, 
Ingram and Goodwin and their emphasis on personal 
freedom and independence as a fundamental principle 
underpinning a rights approach to equality: “the right to self 
ownership as a precursor to citizenship and realisation of 
civil, political, cultural, social and economic rights.” 
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CHAPTER 4: RATIONALES FOR REFORM 
 
4.1 THE CASE FOR MODERNISATION  
 OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM 
The two greatest general policy drivers for reform towards 
individual entitlement are gender equality (economic 
independence) and the interest, from a competitiveness and 
economic growth perspective, in increasing women’s 
participation in the labour market. There are also drivers, 
however, in the wider context such as enhancing work-life 
balance and prevention of adult and child poverty.  
These include: 
 
• The need for measures that reconcile work and family life 
and that offer opportunities to develop the role of fathers 
in family life and allow parents to rebalance care 
responsibilities as they choose;  
 
• The need for measures that promote equality across the 
nine grounds of the equality legislation and between 
different and diverse groups of women, for example 
promoting access to social insurance;  
 
• The need for reduction of the higher risk of poverty faced 
by women and children. Poverty can be reduced both by 
enabling greater labour market participation and by 
redistributing income across the life cycle, particularly to 
people at key stages of care provision; 
 
• The need for reform to reduce the effective marginal tax 
rate on women and so stimulate the opportunities for 
women to engage in employment;   
 
• The need to narrow the gender pay gap and to increase 
choices and opportunities for women to work part-time, 
for example or reconcile work and family life; 
 
• The need to simplify the route from welfare to work; 
 
• The need to further the aim of the Strategic Management 
Initiative to achieve greater policy coherence, simplicity 
and consistency and accommodation of equality and 
diversity; 
 
• The need to institute reform to develop the capacity to 
respond to new and different models of the family. This is 
important in a society with increasing levels not only of 
marriage breakdown and divorce, but also of cohabitation. 
Reform can diminish and eradicate different and unequal 
responses to different household types with similar needs; 
 
• The need to acknowledge the value of care in the context 
of economic and social development and to recognise the 
contribution women make to care. A reform of social 
welfare towards an independent entitlement offers the 
potential to give more formal recognition of the financial 
and social value of child and elder care.  
 
 
4.2  INTERNATIONAL POLICY INFLUENCE ON 
DEMAND FOR MODERNISATION  
 
4.2.1 European Union Policy 
Mangan (2001) makes the point that, where reform has been 
instituted, it has followed legal challenges and EU-imposed 
requirements in relation to equality. The original market 
model of the EU may have pushed that reform in an 
economic or labour market direction. Alternative models of 
reform could have been more social policy orientated such as 
for example a citizenship model (Fitzpatrick, 1996). 
Nonetheless it is well recognized that the EU has played and 
continues to play a crucial role in driving change (Conroy, 
2000).  
 
The EU dimension to social welfare reform is important. The 
EU White Paper on Growth and Competitiveness, commonly 
known as the Delors White Paper (1995), aimed to “eliminate 
any potentially discriminatory fiscal and social protection 
policies which can discourage women’s equal participation in 
the formal labour market”. The Fourth EU Programme for 
Action focused on “proceeding with individualisation of rights 
in social security and tax so as to reduce discrimination in the 
employment market and ensure women’s independence”.  
 
Council decision 22.12.95 OJ L 3 35 30-12-95 committed 
Ireland to the process of individualising rights and the 
promotion of greater gender equality between women and 
men in the economy between 1996 and 2000. Similarly, 
Article 13 of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam promoted non-
discrimination on gender grounds and is currently being 
implemented by way of revision of the EU Equality Directive 
(Harvey, 2002). The annual process of the National 
Employment Action Plan and the bi-annual process of 
ENAPS (the EU open co-ordination of social inclusion 
strategies) also require a focus and action on reform of tax 
and social welfare systems to promote access to employment 
and gender equality.  
 
4.2.2 International Policy 
In the UN context, the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women affirms the importance of 
economic independence and independent income for 
women. The Beijing Platform for Action (1995) committed 
governments to advance the economic independence of 
women. The Beijing process has directly fed into the National 
Plan for Women. In an advisory report for the plan, Galligan 
(2001) proposed two indicators that would imply progress 
through greater reform of social welfare: (i) the proportion of 
women and men without an independent income (ii) the 
distribution of income within households.  
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The International Labour Organisation has targeted 2002 for 
a review of its anti-discrimination framework. The OECD has 
also urged greater tax and welfare reform to support 
women’s participation in the labour force (OECD, 2001).  
 
4.3 THE RATIONALE FOR A SOCIAL WELFARE  
 REFORM MODEL  
This reform agenda has, as its aim, to bring about 
modernisation and reform of social welfare to reflect the 
needs of women. The model respects women’s choices and 
acknowledges the considerable change in what women want 
and need. The model aims to facilitate the flexibility that 
women need and to accommodate and value appropriately 
labour market participation and care roles.  
 
 
The model assumes that most adults have, want to have or 
should have a relationship with the labour market.  
A reform model should enable and facilitate women’s (and 
men’s) participation in the labour market for a substantial 
proportion of their adult lives. Importantly it is not only the tax 
and welfare systems that need reform but the labour market 
itself needs to be flexible enough to reconcile a real worklife 
balance. The model should facilitate care and encourage 
equal sharing of caring work between women and men.  
 
 
The model accepts that labour market participation is the 
primary route towards gender equality in economic terms. 
The social welfare system and especially the social insurance 
scheme is built on the concept of income replacement at key 
times in life when an adult cannot supply his or her own 
earned income. While promoting choice, it is not possible to 
expect a social welfare system to facilitate economic 
independence for specific people for long periods of time. 
Rather, it is distribution over the life cycle that is required. 
The task is to reform social welfare so that it is capable of 
distributing economic independence to women and men at 
key life-stages when they most need it.  
 
The challenge for a reform model is to strike the balance 
between accommodation of, and respect for, care with 
promotion of labour market equality in the context of high 
employment levels for both women and men. The challenge 
is to use the social welfare system actively for women. 
 
The reasons for this necessary balance are the following: 
 
• High levels of employment are required to sustain and 
strengthen social insurance systems; 
• The National Anti-Poverty Strategy establishes the 
importance of paid employment as a primary route out of 
poverty; 
• It is through paid employment that most social insurance 
contributions are paid and the social insurance system 
validated; 
• It is through paid employment that most income  
 is earned; 
• It is through paid employment that occupational pensions 
are ensured. These will be increasingly important 
elements of total pension income; 
• It is well established that the main cause of the gender 
pay gap is the shorter number of years that women spend 
in the labour force with women on average having a 15-
year shorter labour market participation span than men 
and with women’s employment segregated in the lower 
paid sectors of the economy (ESRI, 2002). 
 
4.4 PRINCIPLES OF BROAD SOCIAL WELFARE REFORM 
A reform model that respects and facilitates women as 
workers and carers requires two key features. These are 
developed in the proposals for social insurance and social 
assistance (see chapter 5). 
 
• No reform can be complete without the development of a 
care contingency that enables women to have coverage 
and maintain contribution records at key stages of care. 
Facilitating care should not be disproportionate and 
should not lock women into long-term patterns of caring 
(McLaughlin, 2001). This requires the State to invest in a 
child and elder care infrastructure. 
• Gender income inequality is primarily a function of labour 
market income inequality. Equality can only be achieved 
in the context of a social welfare system that enables and 
encourages women’s participation in the labour market for 
a considerable period of their adult lives. The balance 
between care and work requires flexibility. Part-time 
models of income support are crucial. 
 
In developing a model of reform based on these principles, 
the research has drawn from the following reform proposals 
(these are outlined in Appendix 2): 
• British reform proposals from the Commission on Social 
Justice (1994) and from the TUC (2001); 
• Elements of the recent Australian reform programme  
 (1999); 
• Homemaker Responsibility Allowance as proposed by 
McCashin (1997); 
• NESF Lone Parents Report No 20 (2001); 
• Commission on the Family (1998).  
 
4.5 MODELS OF REFORM: MODERNISATION OF  
 THE SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM 
The issue of modernisation of the social welfare system 
raises the question of the most appropriate vehicle for 
change. The reform debate refers not only to social welfare 
(insurance and assistance) but also to child income support, 
secondary benefits and all aspects of personal taxation. It is 
not intended to review tax, child income support or secondary 
benefits from the perspective of reform in this report, but it is 
well recognised that these are crucial and interdependent 
parts of a larger reform model.  
 21 
Universal adult payments have been proposed as a model for 
individualisation of social welfare. The most limitless form of 
universal payment is a basic income approach which has 
been forwarded as one that will, among other things, achieve 
gender equality in the social welfare system. While the ideas 
and intent behind basic income may have merit, it is not 
advanced in this research as a useful model for the purposes 
of gender-focused reform of the social welfare system. The 
high tax rates required to fund a universal adult approach 
mean that it will be unaffordable, impractical and politically 
not feasible. Such tax rates will also have uncertain labour 
market implications and may cause work disincentives and 
increased participation in the informal economy (McLaughlin, 
1997; Bond, 1996; Department of an Taoiseach, 2001; 
Partnership 2000 Basic Income Working Group Report).  
 
Social assistance means testing is seen to cause stigma, 
work disincentives and dependency. Such means-tested 
systems are best kept as residual features of the social 
welfare system (NESC, 2002). While there is a clear need for 
continuing reform of social assistance (NESF, 2001), this 
reform is in the context of ensuring that as many people as 
possible are covered through the social insurance system 
(NESC, 2002).  
 
There is wide support for enhanced and reformed social 
insurance structures (see Appendix 2 for a review of recent 
debates about broad welfare reform). Both NESC (1999), 
NESC (2002), and the Programme for Prosperity and 
Fairness (2000) endorsed enhancement of the social 
insurance scheme. This approach has been supported by 
gender equality academics. McLaughlin (1997) states that: “it 
will be clear that my own view is that careful extension and 
expansion of the social insurance system offers the most 
feasible route to individualisation over the next 20 years.” It 
also has the support of Government whose reform agenda 
was elaborated by the then Minister, Mr Dermot Ahern TD, in 
a speech (September 2001) where he broadly supported 
reform with two objectives: 
 
• improving the financial position of women; 
• enhancing the possibility for women to achieve economic 
independence, either through independent payments or 
through a more work/family-friendly society.  
 
The Programme for Prosperity and Fairness made a 
commitment to the establishment of a working group to 
“produce proposals for the development of a fully inclusive 
social insurance model which would facilitate combining work 
and family responsibilities in the context of changing working 
and social patterns”. This group was established in March 
2002 and has yet to reach conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6 A FEMINIST REFLECTION ON THE  
 SOCIAL WELFARE REFORM DEBATE  
There is neither total consensus nor a sense of urgency 
about reform of the Irish social welfare system. In a review of 
the reform of Irish social security over the last 80 years, 
McLaughlin, Yeates and Kelly (2001) illustrate how women 
have often benefited least from reform. Reforms that on the 
surface appeared pro-gender equality, or at least pro-woman, 
often served to reinforce the system’s male breadwinner 
structure. Yeates (1998) identified, for example, how the 
introduction of a carer’s allowance has predominantly 
reinforced the role of the female carer. McCashin (1998) is 
highly critical of the Irish record of reform and states: “one 
thread runs through the pattern of policy change; changes 
that might benefit women were slowly or reluctantly or 
ungenerously implemented; on the other hand, changes that 
might benefit men were embraced with alarming alacrity.” He 
deduces that, despite certain rhetoric, the Irish policy system 
has not fully accepted the need to reframe public policy to 
reflect the decline of the traditional, nuclear, male 
breadwinner model. Yeates (1997) identifies how the policy 
process in which the debate takes place is hindered not only 
by the absence of women’s direct and equal participation, but 
also by what she describes as “the hidden structural forces in 
patriarchy that resist any fundamental changes that 
significantly alter the balance between women and men”.  
 
While social partners broadly support reform towards 
individual entitlement, there is not complete societal or 
political support for this direction (see Appendix 1 for a review 
of recent debates). Submissions to the Commission on the 
Family expressed concern that moving towards 
individualisation could be synonymous with materialistic 
individualism and lead to an erosion of family bonds. A small 
but significant minority of submissions to the National Plan for 
Women clearly objected to further economic independence 
for women. The reaction to Budget 2001 “individualisation” of 
the standard tax rate band was evidence, among other 
concerns about recognition of care work, of some support for 
a male breadwinner approach to income support.  
 
Even where there is consensus about reform, it is less than 
clear how or when reform should be achieved. It is evident 
that there is no blueprint for reform. Despite consensus on 
administrative individualisation in NESC (1999) and NESF 
(2001), the process of debate in the Programme for 
Prosperity and Fairness Administrative Individualisation 
Working Group illustrated the different views of the various 
stakeholders and shows how commonality of language can 
disguise very different analyses and opinions. 
 
4.7  THE LANGUAGE OF REFORM  
The debate highlights the need for caution concerning the 
language used in articulating reform proposals. This research 
is focused on modernisation, enhancement and development 
of the social welfare system towards independent entitlement 
for all people. This does not mean unconditional support for 
“reform”. The research recognises that some forms of reform 
or “individualisation” may not be pro-women. 
“Individualisation is not a strategy without potential hazards 
for women” (Sainsbury, 1996). Some reforms may lead to 
more onerous paid work obligations on poorer women 
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without corresponding improvements in women’s access to 
improved levels of social care, such as happened in Britain 
with the imposition of work search obligations on qualified 
adults in job seeker benefit claims. As Yeates (1997) 
concludes: “A narrowly conceived individualisation strategy 
may lead to an intolerable strain on family life.” Recognising 
the difficulty concerning terminology, the choice of language 
in this report has the objective of promoting modernisation, 
inclusivity and independent entitlement to income. What the 
language used intends to convey is a model of reform of 
social assistance and social insurance that will deliver anti-
poverty and equality outcomes and that can reconcile the 
practical care and labour market realities and aspirations of 
women in Ireland in all their diversity.  
 
4.8  THE REFORM DEBATE: SOME CONCLUSIONS  
This debate is complex and even among reform supporters 
there are different emphases on the “labour market” and 
“care” balances. In practice, it is difficult to strike a balance 
between acknowledging the reality of care in women’s lives 
without promoting care exclusively or, on the other hand, 
seeking equal participation in an unreformed labour market. 
The aim is to find the appropriate balance of parenting and 
labour market participation over a family life cycle.  
  
McCashin (1997), for example, argues that a general 
objective of public policy should be to stimulate female labour 
force participation among those groups of women whose 
participation is currently low. He argues this should be an 
overriding objective regardless of parental or marital status. 
Without female labour force participation at the heart of the 
vision of a reformed social welfare system, we will not be 
able to move away from a male breadwinner model. He does, 
however, add the proviso that this is only valid in the context 
of adequate childcare provision. 
 
Yeates, Mc Laughlin and Kelly (2001) argue that reforms 
which increase women’s independent incomes from the tax-
benefit system of social transfers should be prioritised over 
measures that would increase income through earnings. 
They argue that a priority on work-life balance means a focus 
on methods that can transfer high social protection to those 
engaged in social care.  
  
Within this broad debate about reform, there is often a high 
level of ambiguity about a reform that supports women’s 
participation in the labour market. In practice, there is a 
contradictory attitude towards women engaging in 
employment. There is still considerable inequality in the 
labour market (for example the gender pay gap), and lack of 
support for childcare (both supply and demand) leaves 
women with less than equal access to labour market 
participation. This ambiguity and these contradictions can be 
explained by a political and ideological struggle about the role 
of women in society that is still unresolved in Ireland. It is 
against a background of such ambiguity that the debate 
about social welfare reform takes place. 
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CHAPTER 5: A MODEL OF SOCIAL WELFARE REFORM 
5.1  AIM OF PROPOSED REFORM 
This chapter outlines the primary elements needed in social 
welfare reform starting with overall rationale, social 
insurance, social assistance, reform to accommodate 
women’s atypical and part-time work patterns, reforms to 
value and give recognition to parenting and caring and finally 
to maximise the number of women with individual 
entitlements to pensions 
 
5.1.1 Overall Reform Rationale 
This research puts forward proposals for a modern social 
welfare system that would reflect changed social structures. 
These include the increase in female labour force 
participation and the growth in one-parent families, the rising 
number of atypical workers in the economy and the greater 
extent of contract working and movement between jobs. This 
research has already noted the consensus around a model of 
reform that emphasises the role of social insurance as the 
dominant form of social welfare provision. Any model of 
reform or enhancement of social insurance must also be 
consistent with any further social assistance reform. It should 
also be consistent with taxation and child income support 
reform. 
 
This research sets out to develop a model of reform that 
maximises women’s participation in the labour force and, at 
the same time, values and recognises the care that women 
provide in their homes. The model assumes that all women 
will have, and will want to have, a reasonable period of time 
in direct labour market activity but that the labour market (and 
related tax/welfare system) respects work-life balance. The 
model attempts to accommodate the reality that many 
women (either voluntarily or involuntarily) have to opt out of 
the labour market periodically for reasons of care. Getting the 
right balance between work and care is crucial.  
 
It is not the aim of this reform proposal to have all the 
population working “in home duties” covered by a social 
welfare contingency. Rather, its aim and principle are that 
each adult should have an individual relationship with the 
social insurance system, not one mediated through a 
relationship with another adult. In other words, each adult 
should have her or his own contribution record and an 
associated set of direct rights rather than a set of derived 
rights. This is necessarily a long-term programme of reform 
lasting to 2020.  
 
To some extent, this change is occurring naturally as more 
women enter the labour market and accumulate their own 
contribution records rather than relying for social insurance 
rights on the records of their spouses. The percentage of old-
age and retirement pensions requiring qualified adult 
allowances (QAAs) reduced from 42 per cent to 33 per cent 
in the period from 1990-2001. The total number of QAAs is 
dropping in absolute terms and as a percentage of total 
payments. Although no actual projection has been 
undertaken, it is forecast that virtually all women will have a 
direct right to pensions by about 2020. This means that the 
concept of qualified adult will be virtually irrelevant for 
pensions by 2020 approximately. How can the concept of 
independent entitlement become a reality for other social 
insurance and assistance payments?  
 
5.2 Social insurance reform  
The most recent overview of social insurance, the 1996 
Social Insurance Report, accepts that the full-time 
employment male model is problematic for women and 
parents on two fronts: first, the lack of accommodation of 
atypical work; and second, its inability to accommodate full-
time work in the home. The 1996 report favoured developing 
the social insurance system to meet new risks or 
contingencies and identified care and nursing as likely areas 
of new contingencies. The 1996 report is more cautious 
about a reform that could take in the largest group excluded 
from the social insurance scheme: married women and men 
working in the home. The report notes that the cost of making 
social insurance payments to this group might exceed the 
value of their contributions and that such a move could be 
seen as a fundamental departure from the social insurance 
system which “basically insures those who make their living 
from the labour market against the risk of losing that income”.  
 
This reflects the logic of social insurance that part of the 
wealth created during a person’s economically active years is 
used to provide pensions and other entitlements which are 
paid to that person when they are unable to be labour market 
active due to illness, unemployment or old-age. To be 
feasible in political terms, the transition from the traditional 
social insurance male breadwinner structure to a more 
modern inclusive social insurance system must be broadly 
realised within the logic of the present model of social 
insurance. This means that for women to have coverage 
within the social insurance system, they must have some 
exposure to the labour market.  
 
The model developed in this research reflects this broad 
understanding of the social insurance system. The model 
holds, however, that it is still possible to argue for coverage 
of time-limited periods of non-participation in the labour 
market for the contingency involving parenting young 
children. The failure of social insurance to provide income 
replacement for this obvious stage of limited retirement from 
the labour force is illogical in the context of the function of 
social insurance.  
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5.3  THE SOCIAL INSURANCE REFORM MODEL  
A social insurance system that can facilitate a modern labour 
market and modern society can be developed through a 
series of reforms. These reforms can be short- term (S), 
medium-term (M) or long-term (L); some may be transitional 
(T). A time scale and costings are discussed in Chapter Six. 
The reforms are summarised below under four main areas 
and are detailed in the remainder of the chapter under the 
same headings: 
• maximising the number of women with independent 
income;  
• maximising the number of women with individual 
entitlement to pensions; 
• recognising parenting and caring; 
• accommodating atypical and part-time work patterns. 
 
 Pensions - Providing for Older Women without  
Individual Pension Rights  
 
• 100 per cent of QAA paid directly to women until full 
pension coverage for women can be assumed in 2020  
 (2007 and T); 
• Retrospective credits for all women engaged in care, so 
that most women will have direct rights to pensions before 
2020 (S);  
• Changing homemakers’ “disregards” to a system of 
“homemakers’ credits”(S);    
 
Developing a Contingency for Parenting and a Wage for 
Caring   
 
• Development of a mechanism to facilitate care of older 
people to be valued as paid work (L); 
• Extension of maternity leave benefit to 26 weeks (S); 
• Introduction of paid parental leave benefit for parents of 
young children (S);6
• Introduction of part-time parental benefit for parents of 
children up to the age of 11 (M, L);  
 
Recognising the Labour Market Reality of Women’s 
Atypical Employment  
 
• Introduction of a new part-time unemployment benefit for 
parents with children aged 0-12, so that women seeking 
part-time work can have that part-time unemployment 
recognised (S, M); 
• Specific reforms around atypical work for job seekers, 
seasonal and casual workers and the “Relatives 
Assisting” category for spouses of self-employed and 
farmers (S); 
 
Maximising the Number of Women with Independent 
Income 
 
• Review of the two-year rule governing awards of social 
insurance credits. (S) 
 
                                                 
6 Another option, instead of introducing a social assistance and social 
insurance-based parenting benefit / allowance would be to relax the 
GSW/ASW requirement for those on UB and UA until their child is a specific 
age. 
5.4  SOCIAL ASSISTANCE REFORM  
From an equality and anti-poverty perspective, the NWCI 
gives considerable priority to reform of the social assistance 
scheme. For women vulnerable to poverty, the intricacies of 
the means-tested social assistance scheme identified in 
Chapter 2 can have a negative impact on life. The social 
assistance scheme should enable women to progress into 
employment and broad labour market participation and 
should facilitate new forms of family formation. Enabling the 
transition to work is a key anti-poverty strategy and a key 
objective of the model of reform developed below.  
 
Even with a fully developed social insurance system, there 
will still remain a large residual social assistance scheme to 
meet the needs of people who are ineligible for a social 
insurance payment either because: 
 
• They do not have sufficient social insurance paid or 
credited to be eligible;  
• Their specific life situation is not covered by a social 
insurance contingency. 
 
In the short to medium-term, there are anomalies and 
inconsistencies in the present social assistance means-
testing rules that can cause unequal outcomes between 
women and men or between different groups of women. 
These can cause poverty and unemployment traps and 
should be removed as a matter of urgency. A number of 
recommendations in NESF reports Numbers 3, 20 and 21 are 
compatible with longer-term reform but can be implemented 
soon and at relatively little cost. These include indexation of 
income disregards and simplification of tapered means tests 
income bands. Along with such micro short-term reform, 
there is a broader need to reform social assistance from the 
perspective of gender, labour market considerations and 
competitiveness. 
 
Tools for Reform of Social Assistance 
For social assistance reforms to be meaningful, it is vital to 
engage in structural reform at the heart of the social 
assistance system and to abolish the limitation rule. This is 
considered a necessary backdrop to effective reform and is 
discussed in greater detail below. The intended result of 
abolition of limitation would be that both adults in a two-
couple jobless household would have their own payment in 
their own right, for example that each would have his/her own 
independent income based on a household means test. 
Using the same format as in social insurance we can identify 
four broad areas for reform. These are outlined here and 
discussed in further detail later: 
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Accommodating Women’s Atypical  
and Part-Time Work Patterns  
 
• Introduction of part-time unemployment assistance (M); 
• Rectification of short-term means testing anomalies (S); 
• Measures to reduce numbers of qualified adults (S-M). 
 
Recognising Parenting and Caring 
 
• Introduction of parental allowance parallel to parental 
benefit (M-L); 
• Introduction of a part-time carer’s allowance (L);  
• Making carer’s allowance into a wage (L). 
 
Maximising the Number of Women  
with Individual Entitlement to Pensions 
 
• Ensuring that the qualified adult rate of old age pensions 
reaches 100 per cent of the non-contributory old-age 
pension adult rate by 2007 (S); 
• Ensuring as many women as possible have access to 
social  insurance-based pensions (M).  
 
Maximising the Number of Women  
with Independent Income 
 
• Abolition of limitation rule (S). 
 
 
 
5.5 MAXIMISING THE NUMBER OF WOMEN  
 WITH INDIVIDUAL ENTITLEMENT TO PENSIONS 
 
5.5.1 Recent Reforms in Social Welfare Pensions Policy  
A key challenge is to find a way to ensure full and 
independent pension coverage for as many women as 
possible as soon as possible. Recent reforms, including the 
homemaker’s scheme and increases in the qualified adult 
allowance for old age pensions, are welcome.7 As part of a 
process of more wide-ranging reform, they are important 
steps in general progress towards greater individual 
entitlement in the social insurance system. While the report 
does not deal with occupational pensions, it is well 
recognised that access to occupational pensions will be a 
major factor for women and for this reason it is even more 
important that reform should enable maximum labour market 
participation by women. 
  
5.5.2 Recognition of Pre-1953  
  Social Insurance Contributions  
The Review of Qualifying Contributions recommendation to 
recognise pre-1953 social insurance contributions was 
quickly implemented. This means that more older women 
now qualify for partial pensions. By September 2002 up to 
25,000 people had applied for the special pre-1953 old-age 
contributory pension, 12,280 had been awarded the half-rate 
pension and 217 the full-rate pension. Up to 7,225 were 
                                                 
7 While welcome, they have ironically reinforced a male breadwinner 
approach, the former by not comprehensively valuing care, the latter by 
maintaining a derived right to a pension 
deemed unsuccessful (some of whom may have eventual 
entitlement due to a combination of pre-1953 and social 
insurance contributions from working abroad). A further 8,500 
pro-rata pensioners are now getting the pre-1953 pension. 
While this progress is welcome, the problem remains that 
pre-1953 applicants are not receiving full pensions because 
the system does not recognise the caring work which they 
have undertaken for many years.  
 
5.5.3 Increasing the Qualified Adult Rate for Pensions 
from 70 per cent to 100 per cent of the Adult Rate  
The Government commitment to 100 per cent qualified adult 
allowance for the non-contributory old-age pension began in 
Budget 2001 when the QAA rate for those over 66 was 
increased by £15 per week and the Minister announced his 
intention to increase the rate to that of the full NCOAP (equal 
to 90 per cent of the OAP). The Minister stated that this was 
to pay a pension to women currently at or near pension age 
who could not benefit from the easing of qualifying conditions 
for pensions or from the homemaker’s scheme and who 
would not receive a payment in their own right. Some 
progress was made in Budget 2002 and 2003.  
 
The recent Programme for Government 2002-07 committed 
to reaching the 100 per cent NCOAP target by 2007. This is 
in keeping with the recommendation 9.33 of the National 
Pensions Board that the QAA be paid directly to the 
dependant of pension age and be called the  
old age allowance. While welcome, this is clearly not an 
independent entitlement but a direct payment of a derived 
right. Given that the woman’s right to the payment is still 
technically derived from her husband’s record, this would not 
be a full model of independent entitlement but it is useful as a 
transitional arrangement in the context of more structural 
reform of social insurance. 
 
5.5.4 Homemaker’s Disregard or Credit  
An existing 1994 homemaker’s scheme caters for people 
who spend periods of time – up to a maximum of 20 years – 
outside the labour force caring either for children or 
incapacitated people. It works by “disregarding” time spent 
caring when calculating a person’s contributory old-age 
pension entitlement. When the person’s contribution record is 
averaged, the disregard increases the likelihood of achieving 
eligibility criteria for the contributory pension. This can be 
distinguished from a credit which would be added to a 
person’s contribution record before the average contribution 
was calculated. A credit rather than disregard option was 
originally considered and rejected at the time of introduction 
of the homemaker’s scheme, mainly on the grounds of cost.  
 
Since then, the 1999 Expenditure Review of Credited 
Contributions considered this issue as did the Review of 
Qualifying Contributions for the old-age contributory and 
retirement pensions. The Credits Expenditure Review noted 
that disregards gave no value for short-term payments and 
gave a slightly lower yearly average than if credits were 
awarded. It was noted that disregards were beneficial for 
homemakers because they were not affected by the S.57 SI 
312 1996 rule, where a person with no SI record for more 
than two years must have 26 paid contributions before credits 
can be awarded.  
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Notwithstanding the latter difficulty, the 1999 review 
concluded that it would be useful to see if disregards and 
credits could be managed within a single arrangement. The 
Review of Qualifying Contributions was largely satisfied that 
the proposal for a switch from disregards to credits was 
warranted. The question of converting these disregards to a 
system of credits is being considered in the second phase of 
the Review of Qualifying Contributions for old-age 
contributory pensions. It is understood that this review is also 
positively disposed towards managing the homemaker’s 
pension by way of credits rather than disregards. This 
research concludes it would be more constructive to see 
women’s care work as making a contribution (rather than 
being disregarded) and support the proposals to move from a 
disregard to a credit.  
 
5.5.5 Homemaker’s Retrospection  
The scheme is available only to women registered as 
homemakers since 1994, to women whose children are 
under-12 or are in need of full-time care because of a 
disability. It does not extend to women required to give up 
work due to the marriage bar which operated until 1973. 
There have been consistent demands to apply the scheme 
retrospectively to 1973. The Review of Qualifying 
Contributions is broadly supportive of retrospection. 
However, it also notes the financial implications of greater 
pensions costs and the difficulty of deciding a retrospection 
date; the administrative implications of the retrospective 
application of the 1994 scheme; the difficulty of ascertaining 
whether a person was in a care position for all of these years. 
In addition, there are fears of false expectations being raised, 
as many of the women will still not qualify for pensions 
because they will not have had prior paid contributions. It 
raises what is probably the most serious obstacle to reform: 
maintaining the logic of the social insurance principle and the 
difficulty in finding a balance or a parity of treatment between 
full-time “contributors” and those on credits. 
 
This research concludes it is reasonable and practical to 
apply the 1994 homemaker’s scheme retrospectively to 1973 
and to allow those women at least the maximum 20 years, 
already allowed for under the homemaker’s scheme. This is 
supported by the National Council on Ageing and Older 
People. 
 
5.5.6 Contributions and Eligibility Review  
In the context of a move from disregards to credits and 
towards retrospective credits, the Review of Qualifying 
Contributions is very important (especially given the need to 
safeguard the viability of the social insurance scheme). 
Phase one of the review recommended a switch from  
a yearly average calculation to a total number of contributions 
(paid and credited) calculation. Phase two is now examining 
this recommendation. There are clear issues for women in 
the degree to which the review  
strikes a balance between valuing paid contributions over 
credited contributions. The number of paid contributions 
required to qualify is already increasing from 260 to 520 in 
2010. This is largely acceptable and in line with European 
norms. The research recommends that a gender impact 
assessment of recommendations arising from phase two of 
the Review of Qualifying Contributions recommendations 
should be undertaken. 
 
5.5.7 Non-contributory Old Age Pension  
The limitation rule does not apply to non-contributory old age 
pension (NCOAP), and this is welcome. It is essential, 
however, for anti-poverty reasons to ensure that the NCOAP 
is adequate and indexed to average earnings growth in the 
economy. 
 
5.6  DEVELOPING A CONTINGENCY FOR PARENTING 
  AND WAGE FOR CARING   
 
5.6.1 Maternity Benefit Should be Extended to 26 Weeks  
At present, there is provision in the social insurance system 
for 18 weeks’ paid maternity leave and eight weeks’ unpaid 
leave. The NWCI has previously recommended8 that 
maternity leave should be extended to six months (26 full 
weeks), paid at the present rate and with the present 
contribution eligibility.  
 
5.6.2 Parental Leave Payments 
Promotion of Parenting Role of Fathers  
It is worth noting that non-transferable paid parental leave 
produces the greatest take-up of parental leave by men, an 
important feature of a gender equality reform worker model. 
The design of a parental benefit / assistance model is 
important and any model should seek to encourage 
maximum male participation in childcare. 
 
5.6.2.1  Social Insurance Parental Leave Benefit  
   Full-Time and Part-Time 
Various organisations (including the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions) have developed proposals to introduce a social 
insurance-based parental leave benefit. This is to 
complement the Parental Leave Act (1998) which entitles 
parents to 14 weeks’ unpaid leave to care for children under 
the age of five. The Commission on the Family  (1999) 
concluded that the PRSI maternity benefit scheme should be 
extended to cover parental leave and to provide a weekly 
payment on the lines of maternity benefit to workers availing 
of the parental leave under the EU directive. The Programme 
for Prosperity and Fairness provided for a working group to 
review provision of this act. This working group made a 
majority recommendation in April 2002 that parental leave 
should be extended to 18 weeks and that a social insurance 
payment should be introduced to cover this leave.  
                                                 
8 NWCI submission 
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While the Department of Social and Family Affairs has raised 
the possibility of administrative difficulties, there is 
acceptance that it is reasonable to develop a social insurance 
contingency for paid parental leave. This is a common 
feature in other European social insurance schemes where 
seven other countries have paid parental leave. Such 
provision of a social insurance-based payment for parental 
leave is an important feature of reform of the social welfare 
system.  
 
5.6.2.2  Parental Leave Allowance in Social Assistance  
This recommendation is built on an NESF discussion of a 
model for reforming social assistance. The NESF Report on 
Lone Parents (2001) and the Department of Social, Family 
Affairs One-Parent Payment Review (2000)9 concluded that 
there needed to be a reform of social assistance to facilitate 
lone parents’ family formation choices.  
 
The reform focused on the introduction of a parental 
allowance payment available to any parent, if that parent was 
to pass a household means test and was caring for a child 
under a specific age. The parental allowance would be paid 
at the same rate as unemployment assistance. When the 
child reached a specific age, the provision of a part-time 
parental allowance would allow one parent to choose part-
time care. When the child reached a specific age, the part-
time parental allowance would no longer be available and the 
parent in need of income support would have to be fully 
available for work to receive full rate adult unemployment 
assistance.  
 
Length of Benefit / Allowance and Age of Children  
In a model that is evolving over years, the length of maternity 
leave and paid parental leave will expand so that the caring 
role of parents with young children will be seen as a real 
rather than symbolic contingency in the social welfare 
system. We note that in some countries up to three years of 
caring is facilitated through the social welfare system. 
Recognising the under-provision of appropriate day-care for 
children, the benchmark of five years could be used for full-
time parental benefit and parental assistance. As an interim 
target, Ireland should have as a benchmark the best of 
European practice (Commission on the Family, 1999).  
 
Part-time parental benefit / allowance  
Recognising the limitations of any childcare infrastructure and 
the validity of the choice to care for children at home and 
                                                 
9 The NESF Report on Lone Parents (2001), building on the Department's 
one-parent Payment Review (2000), concluded that in the context of the  
present social welfare system, the most effective way of meeting the 
disincentives that exist for lone parents with regard to cohabitation is to 
restructure present contingencies to facilitate those who decide to cohabit or 
marry. In this context, the report went some way towards the development of a 
model to reform the way the social assistance system caused barriers to family 
formation and poverty traps for lone parents.  
The team recognised the fact that its outline ideas would have major 
implications for the system of welfare, and would influence the debate about 
individualisation of tax and welfare, the future of the qualified adult allowance in 
social welfare, the argument concerning economies of scale in welfare-
dependent households and the debate about a parenting payment in the social 
welfare system. The report, recognising that more work needs to be done, 
made no recommendations. 
 
children’s own needs, a part-time parental allowance should 
be available for parents with children in primary and early 
secondary school. This would be available so that parents 
could combine part-time work (or part-time job search if 
unemployed) and part-time parenting. 
 
5.6.3 Recognition of Care for Elderly and Disability  
This research advocates that the social welfare system 
should move as far as possible to a gender neutral 
combination that supports women’s work and care. It should 
be a principle of reform that all care that is not “parenting” 
should be classed as work. Such work could receive a 
payment. Instead of enhancing and increasing the numbers 
of care contingencies in the social welfare system, the reform 
would focus on paying carers for their work.  
 
In effect, if the means test for carer’s allowance was 
abolished, this would become a carer’s wage. This wage 
would then be subject to PRSI and women in caring positions 
would be able to build up an independent social insurance 
record. This would also mean that carers could share a 
carer’s wage between family members and/or others and that 
the optimum care arrangements would evolve for carers and 
persons needing care.  
 
5.7 RECOGNISING THE LABOUR MARKET REALITY  
 OF WOMEN’S ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT  
  
5.7.1 Part-time Unemployment Benefit  
  and Unemployment Assistance for Parents  
  with Children Aged 0-12 
It is clear that part-time unemployment benefit is crucial to 
any reform model. The 1994 Commission for Social Justice 
Reform proposal in Britain and the Australian model either 
included a part-time unemployment benefit or facilitated 
partners in jobless households to access part-time work 
through a system of individualised income disregards. 
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There are gender equality issues in models that promote 
part-time work. Reform in the Netherlands meant that it now 
has the greatest proportion of women working part-time (68.3 
per cent compared to a EU norm of 31.5 per cent). 
Planetenga (1999) defined the Dutch model as the  
1-earner model - with women emphatically in the role of 
secondary earner. This model does not necessarily promote 
gender equality.  
 
While the details of how part-time work is recognised and 
facilitated are important, it does appear necessary to develop 
a contingency that recognises the reality of work-life balance 
choices facing families, especially women with childcare 
responsibilities.  
 
Such an unemployment benefit or assistance would be paid 
when a person, because of childcare commitments, was 
available only for part-time work but could not find such work. 
At present, a person seeking part-time work is ineligible for 
unemployment benefit or assistance because s/he is unable 
to prove that s/he is available for, and seeking, full-time work. 
It can be argued the present system pushes women looking 
for part-time work simply to lie and say they are looking for 
full-time work and this does indeed happen. One cannot 
conclude, however, that this is a satisfactory arrangement 
from the perspective of the woman or the State. It would be 
more useful to insert into the social welfare system a 
payment that would recognise the reality that for many 
women with children the only viable option is part-time work. 
It is demeaning for women to force them to lie to fit into a 
male breadwinner concept of full-time work, with penalties 
accruing if they get caught.  
 
At present, the system recognises part-time unemployment 
when a person seeking full-time work can find only part-time 
work. The system does not encourage part-time employment 
options as a life choice and effectively limits this as an option 
by requiring a person to prove a loss of substantial earnings 
to continue a part-time unemployment benefit claim after the 
initial claim period has elapsed. This control feature 
effectively denies a work-life balance combining part-time 
work and part-time care which could be a realistic choice for 
many parents. There are fears that the availability of a part-
time unemployment benefit would be used to supplement 
earnings from part-time work for people available for full-time 
work (although the fact that this proposal is only available for 
parents with children under-12 would limit this concern.) 
 
A part-time unemployment option could facilitate women to 
make a long-term transition into full-time employment. Given 
the labour market needs of the country and women’s 
increasingly high education attainment, it would seem foolish 
to force women to make artificial choices between full-time 
work and full-time care. The short-term cost of part-time 
unemployment benefit or assistance needs to be viewed 
against the longer-term benefit to competitiveness of greater 
labour force participation by women. Furthermore, a higher 
percentage of female labour force participation would bring 
more tax and social insurance revenue into the Exchequer 
and generate savings in education and retraining.  
 
 
5.7.2 Administrative Anomalies Regarding  
  Atypical Work  
Administrative simplicity and an understandable and 
accessible credits system are essential features of a modern 
social welfare system. The 1999 Credits Review highlighted 
anomalies emerging from the administrative complexity of the 
PRSI credits system where confusion, take-up barriers and 
inadequate responses to staff training and information needs 
all lead to a less than effective credit system. There are still 
access issues like time limits and other artificial barriers that 
need to be removed. Take-up campaigns and effective use of 
information technology should be utilised to ensure that 
everyone is enabled to maximise their credit records. The 
use of new information technology-based systems like 
Reach, Oasis and Pension Forecasting could have the 
potential to increase take-up and generate interest. 
 
5.7.3 Atypical Workers and Social Insurance Coverage 
The 1996 Social Insurance in Ireland Report noted the need 
to develop a comprehensive social insurance scheme that 
could recognise the many varied work patterns in a modern 
economy. The NWCI in submissions to the Programme for 
Prosperity and Fairness (NWCI, 2000) the Review of the 
National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NWCI, 2001) and Budget 
Submissions (NWCI, 2002) highlighted the need to design a 
social insurance system that would recognise the reality of 
women’s work and take into account periods in and out of the 
workforce due to the diverse types of work in which women 
are more likely to be engaged. The substantial loss of 
earnings rule requires a person to have lost substantial 
employment before becoming re-eligible for unemployment 
benefit. This rule means that people in part-time atypical work 
cannot rely long-term on unemployment benefit to subsidise 
their income. This should be assessed to ensure that the rule 
is not causing involuntary part-time unemployment or leading 
low-paid workers into situations of poverty. 
 
Up to 98 per cent of those in job-sharing positions are 
women. The Irish Council for Trade Unions has highlighted a 
number of issues concerning access to benefits for 
jobsharers, some of whom cannot qualify for homemakers’ 
credits for the weeks during which they are not working. This 
administrative obstacle in the credit system should be 
reviewed.  
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5.7.4 Self-Employment  
There are also issues of coverage for women and men 
working in family businesses and treated as “relatives 
assisting”. These people are often spouses of the business 
owners and usually women. There should at least be 
obligatory insurance of all workers in family businesses. 
Legislation should be changed to enable self-employed 
people to ensure their spouses and relatives assisting are 
fully insured, as recommended by the 1999 Credits 
Expenditure Review and the 1996 Social Insurance Report.  
 
5.7.4.1  Farming Women  
Farming women are a specific category of women working in 
family businesses who may face specific difficulties in arriving 
at self-employed status. Only 3 per cent of farms are in joint 
ownership and 93 per cent of farms are  
owned by men. While 50 per cent of farmwomen have 
independent income and social insurance, the Irish Farmers’ 
Association has identified that the remaining 50 per cent 
have no independent pension rights. An interdepartmental 
working group reviewed the situation of farmwomen, 
following a report from the advisory group on the role of 
women in agriculture, and concluded that the partnerships 
between spouses route is the most immediate mechanism for 
farmwomen to have self-employed PRSI coverage10. The 
Irish Farmers’ Association is not satisfied that sufficient 
measures have been taken to promote partnership options to 
farming women and have put a number of proposals to the 
Department. Alternative ways of managing the situation 
include enabling self-employed businesses to insure relatives 
assisting (as above).  
 
5.7.5 Informal Economy  
Administrative reforms could usefully be used to tackle 
eligibility and coverage issues for women working in the 
informal economy. There are a large group of women who 
will not have coverage because they are working within the 
informal economy either as childcare workers or as relatives 
assisting. For some, the issue is not one of typical tax 
avoidance but fear of disclosure of income because of 
poverty and unemployment traps. Provision should be made 
to exempt childcare earnings from social welfare means tests 
and tax assessment and to facilitate easy purchase of PRSI 
credits or stamps. Facilitation of “buying a stamp” models 
where people could self-insure with administrative ease could 
be a useful model for localised purchase of social insurance. 
 
5.8 MAXIMISING THE NUMBER OF WOMEN  
 WITH INDEPENDENT ENTITLEMENT 
 
5.8.1 Social Insurance Coverage and Gaps  
The S 57 SI 312 1996 rule states that a person with no social 
insurance record for more than two years must have 26 paid 
                                                 
10 Farm women who can prove partnership (e.g income tax returns, profit 
sharing from work on farms and joint ownership of herds) are entitled to pay 
PRSI as self employed or if earnings are under €3,714 to make voluntary 
contributions for PRSI coverage. Relevant departments have assured the IFA 
that they will ensure that no anomalies exist in relation to this scheme. The IFA 
have asked for feedback on how this option is working at a practical level for 
women. Clearly, there are concerns that farming women face particular social, 
cultural and administrative barriers to the “partnership model” of social 
insurance coverage. 
contributions before credits can be awarded. This can put 
some people at an immediate disadvantage where they have 
a contingency that can enable them to be awarded credits 
but cannot access the credits unless they first pay 26 
contributions. This is obviously an issue for lone parents, 
people on social assistance payment, non-nationals, 
returning emigrants, young people, etc. The concept of pre-
entry credits has been used to accommodate this issue but 
would need to be more widely available to ensure maximum 
coverage.  
 
An alternative obstacle is that a person with a social 
insurance record from an EU member-State cannot activate 
that record until the person has paid at least one full PRSI 
contribution in Ireland. This obviously affects returning 
emigrants and immigrants. This arises from implementation 
of EU legislation and should be reviewed at this level.  
 
5.8.2 Social Assistance Limitation  
The working group examining the treatment of married, 
cohabiting and one-parent families under the tax and welfare 
codes (1999) examined anomalies within and between the 
social welfare and tax codes in the treatment of different 
family types. Among the issues the group identified was the 
limitation rule, identified as a clear example of the continuing 
adherence to the male breadwinner model, where couples 
who claim unemployment assistance are both paid 50 per 
cent of 1.7 times the adult payment rather than two separate 
adult payments (see 3.5.3 for further analysis of this rule). 
This provision undermines the financial advantage women 
may have in claiming a payment in their own right and makes 
it less likely that women will seek a payment in their own 
right.  
 
In addition, by not claiming in their own right, these people, 
mainly women, in turn are not recognised as part of the 
labour force and can be excluded from a range of 
subsequent employment schemes and training programmes, 
participation in which is dependent on the live register. The 
recent introduction of the “spousal swop” allows spouses to 
transfer entitlement to labour market programmes and this 
has gone some way to reduce the qualified adult’s exclusion 
from labour market programmes. But it would be more 
efficient for the qualified adult to qualify in her or his own 
right.  
 
The principle of limitation was subsequently extended to 
other social assistance payments. The policy is unevenly 
applied, however, with some social assistance payments 
affected and others remaining unaffected. The families 
affected are more likely to be living in poverty as a direct 
result of the rule. This research recommends abolition of this 
limitation rule. This would also enable lone parents to move 
more smoothly into alternative family formation situations.  
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5.8.3 Administrative Supports to Offer Choice to QAAs 
The abolition of limitation increases the possibility of 
maximising the number of women with independent 
entitlement. It gives increased financial incentive to each 
qualified adult (QA) for whom social assistance is claimed to 
establish a record in her or his own right. This will require a 
process where there is advocacy to enable women and men 
to maximise the opportunity to access an independent 
payment or social insurance record. This will involve 
identifying for each qualified adult the most likely route to 
independent entitlement and in so doing reducing as much as 
possible the number of QAAs in the social welfare system. 
This could be done in the short- to medium-term and could 
be facilitated, as recommended, by introducing contingencies 
relating to full and part-time care and part-time 
unemployment payments. The concept of a QAA payment 
will need to be a feature of the system for the foreseeable 
future because there will be some people who will, in the 
short or long-term, not qualify for an independent payment 
because: 
  
• They cannot prove social insurance eligibility, for 
example, they have insufficient social insurance 
contributions; 
• They cannot pass a means test based on spouses’ 
earnings (household means test). This mainly refers to 
QAAs on social insurance claims, 30 per cent of 
whom, it has been estimated, would not qualify for 
means-tested payments; 
• They cannot prove they are eligible under any of the 
available contingencies, for example they are not sick, 
disabled, caring, parenting, unemployed, etc.  
 
In practice, administratively, the target to provide all QAs with 
independent entitlement would happen over a long period 
and eventually the QAA would be very much the exception 
rather than the rule. The abolition of the limitation rule is a 
primary factor in achieving this reform. The faster new 
contingencies are introduced, the faster qualified adults can 
move to a situation of independent entitlement.  
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CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
6.1 OVERVIEW 
This research puts forward a model for a modern social 
welfare system which is intended to maximise labour market 
participation, accommodate atypical work and, at the same 
time, recognise and value, in monetary terms, parental and 
other forms of care and maximise the number of women with 
independent entitlements to pensions.  
 
This model has a long-term timeframe requiring incremental 
implementation over 20 years and accommodating a range  
 
of transition arrangements. The model is summarised below 
under the following headings: 
  
• Social insurance and social assistance combined model; 
• Implementation, barriers to implementation  
 and timetable; 
• Costings; 
• Outcomes, equality proofing and poverty proofing; 
• The way forward in the policy process. 
6.2 COMBINED SOCIAL INSURANCE AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE  
 
 Pensions: Provision for Older Women without Individual Pension Rights   
 
• 100 per cent QAA to be paid directly until full pension coverage for women can be assumed in 2020.  
 By 2007, the QA rate for OAP and NCOAP would be set at 100 per cent of the NCOAP  (S); 
• Introduction of retrospective credits from 1973 for all women engaged in care, so that most women would have direct rights to 
pensions before 2020 (S);  
• Change from homemaker’s disregards to homemaker’s credits (S). 
 
Developing a Contingency for Parenting and Wage for Caring   
 
• Extension of maternity benefit to 26 weeks (S); 
• Introduction of paid parental leave benefit for parents of young children (S); 
• Introduce part-time parental benefit for parents of children up to the age of 11 (M, L); 
• Introduction of a means-tested parental allowance (S); 
• Introduction of a means-tested part-time parental allowance (M); 
• Development of a mechanism to value care of older people as paid work by turning carer’s benefit and allowance into a wage (L). 
 
Recognising the Labour Market Reality of Women’s Atypical Employment  
 
• Introduction of a new part-time unemployment benefit for parents with children aged 0-12, so that women seeking part-time work 
would have their part-time unemployment recognised (S, M); 
• Introduction of specific reforms around a typical work for job seekers, seasonal and casual workers (S); 
• Introduction of specific reforms in relation to relatives assisting for spouses of self employed / farmers (S); 
• Introduction of a new part-time unemployment assistance payment for parents with children aged 0-12, so that women seeking 
part-time work could have their part-time unemployment recognised (S, M); 
• Rectification of means testing anomalies (S). 
 
Maximising the Number of Women with Independent Entitlement 
• Rectification of issues relating to gaps in credits coverage (S); 
• Abolition of limitation rule (S). 
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6.3  THE PACE OF MODERNISATION  
As discussed in Chapter 5, the concept of a qualified adult 
allowance payment will need to be a feature of the system for 
the foreseeable future. However, the more quickly new 
contingencies are introduced, the more quickly qualified 
adults can move to a situation of independent entitlements.  
 
6.3.1 Movement from Qualified Adult Allowances  
  to Full Direct Adult Payment 
A number of implementation issues arise in movement from a 
status of qualified adult to recipient of an independent 
payment. While these are notable, they do not pose sufficient 
reasons in themselves for not implementing this reform. The 
points below chart the broad direction of that movement. 
• Once a qualified adult was to qualify for any of the 
contingencies above and pass a household (based on 
spouse’s or partner’s income) means test, s/he could claim 
an adult payment in her / his own right; 
• Those able to meet a contingency but not a means test 
might have a social insurance contingency; 
• Those who could not access an assistance or insurance 
payment might be able to access a credit because they might 
still pass a contingency; 
• Those who could not do any of the above might have to 
remain as qualified adults in the short to medium-term. One 
could expect, however, that qualified adults would gradually 
fade out of the system. Given that qualified adults only get 
0.7 of the adult payment, there is no great motivation for 
women or men to be qualified adults. 
 
6.4  WORKLIFE BALANCE  
See Appendix 5 for illustrations of the range of life options 
opened up through the proposed reform model. 
 
The intended outcome is for all adults in a social-assistance 
based family to have a payment of their own. Those with 
dependent children would get a parental allowance or an 
unemployment allowance (full-time or part-time). Those with 
no dependent children would move onto unemployment 
assistance. This would be subject to an upper limit of 55 
years after which pre-retirement allowance (PRETA)1111 
would apply. Such a move would increase income to welfare 
dependent homes (from 1.7 to 2). The quid pro quo, 
however, would be that qualified adults would have to be 
actively seeking work, or have some other contingency, to 
claim payments in their own right. The trade-off is, of course, 
that the contingency of parenting would be recognised and 
facilitated in the social assistance scheme.  
 
6.5  IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND BARRIERS  
  TO REFORM   
 
6.5.1 Older Women  
Up to 27,778 women are qualified adults of spouses or 
partners on pensions (DSCFA, 2000). Evidence shows that 
women retire at an earlier age than men, perhaps often 
retiring the same time as their (older) husband. This cohort is 
                                                 
11 Pre-Retirement Allowance (PRETA) is a payment which allows those aged 
55 or over to opt to retire from the labour force and receive a weekly 
allowance. 
unlikely to be able to prove independent entitlement by way 
of employment nor are they likely (given the possibility of 
their husbands having occupational pensions) to pass a 
household means test. 
 
One concern raised in consultation is the need to respect 
traditional choices and not to force change on women and 
men who have made valid life choices. In this case, there is a 
concern that women over 55 should not be forced into the 
labour market. These women should be facilitated towards 
independent entitlement through the use of pre-retirement 
allowances or credits. Many women of this age, however, are 
actively seeking work and may well be entitled to 
unemployment assistance in their own right (or be eligible to 
sign on for credits if household means are too high).  
 
If the aim is to encourage economic independence and if, for 
labour market or equity reasons, this was desirable sooner 
rather than later, it would be possible to develop a transition 
PRETA-like payment for women aged 45-55 who have not 
been in work for more than 20 years and whose husbands 
have retired. This transition payment could be at the same 
rate as qualifed adult allowance but paid by way of 
independent entitlement. 
 
6.5.2 Technical Issues with Fast-Flow Payments  
There are technical issues with fast-flow payments where 
claimants move in and out of the social welfare system very 
quickly and the income replacement function needs to be 
managed in a short timeframe. This is especially the case for 
disability benefit and also unemployment benefit. Three 
directions for reform are possible  
 
• As a transitional or continuing arrangement, qualified 
adults could remain as a feature of these payments for a 
defined period; 
• As a transitional or continuing arrangement, qualified 
adults could remain for periods up to three months, after 
which a move from qualified adult could be facilitated; 
• Alternatively, expenditure saved on qualified adults could 
be used to increase the payment rate for these payments, 
so that the short-term rate would move closer to an 
income replacement rate through, for example, the re-
introduction of pay-related benefit. 
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6.5.3 Women in the Informal Economy  
Some women may resist the move from QA to UA because 
they do not want to seek work actively or because they may 
be in the informal economy or in the formal economy and 
earning less than €88.88 gross per week. There is no 
estimate of how many women are working in the informal 
economy but the fact that 85 per cent of all childcare 
economy is informal (Goodbody, 2000) indicates that there 
are a large number of women in the informal economy. While 
only 2,000 qualified adults are on reduced rate payment due 
to earnings, it is likely that many women are working formally 
or informally and earning just below the threshold governing 
qualified adults’ means tests. While these women would 
benefit from formalised work arrangements and social 
insurance coverage in the short-term, one would not want 
these women to lose income or employment in the move 
from qualified adults to independent entitlement. Those 
qualified adults resistant to move could stay on as qualified 
adult and at 0.7 payment.  
 
6.5.4 Resistance Due to Fears About  
  Limiting Social Insurance  
There is likely to be resistance to this proposal based on 
fears that a weakening of a dependency-based payment 
structure could be seen as a way of running down the 
traditional social insurance rights of workers. Pay related 
social insurance is seen by many trade unionists as being for 
“contributors or workers”. It has traditionally been used to 
support primarily work-based contingencies and there would 
be inevitable resistance to extending social insurance beyond 
the boundaries of the labour market. These proposals could, 
however, be interpreted as strengthening and expanding the 
social insurance system and giving both women and men a 
greater opportunity for work-life balance. Such reforms 
should also be introduced in the context of other reforms, for 
example the re-introduction of pay-related benefit. 
 
6.5.5 Male Resistance 
There is also likely to be resistance from men, who may view 
receipt of the QAA as a right. As with isolated cases of social 
welfare payments being reduced as a consequence of 
qualified adult earnings, there may also be isolated instances 
of internal household conflict about distribution of income 
(DSCFA, 2002). While women need clear support in these 
cases, the fact that such resistance may exist reinforces 
arguments for independent income for women.  
 
6.5.6 Fears About Inflexibility/Orientation  
  of the Direction of Reform 
There may be resistance from those who view this type of 
reform as too labour market-oriented or as failing to provide 
for women unable to work because of specific family 
situations, for example – an older child with special need. 
The new model that encourages labour market participation 
would have to be flexible and acknowledge different types of 
caring, so that most life events preventing a person from 
engaging in employment would be fairly and reasonably 
accommodated within the welfare system, either through 
social insurance or assistance.  
 
There are various ways the model can be adapted to enable 
greater or lesser degrees of worklife balance and to 
recognise gradients of care. The fundamental recognition and 
accommodation of atypical and part-time work is fundamental 
to this aim.  
 
6.6  COSTINGS 
Due to data availability problems, it has not been possible to 
cost all recommendations. The table below illustrates 
available costings and issues that arise in attempting to cost 
some of the specific recommendations as was the case in 
July 2002. Further and more exact costings will be available 
following publication of the Review of Credits by the 
Department of Social and Family Affairs expected before the 
end of 2002. Static cost may vary considerably from dynamic 
cost. Costings are likely to be low in the first instance as the 
cost of some of the proposals will be met as a transfer within 
the social welfare system (with present qualified adult 
allowances or one parent family claims changing to full adult 
claims). However, the cost may rise in the medium-term and 
drop considerably in the longer-term as the employment 
participation outcomes become apparent. 
 
The specific costings depend on the timing of any changes 
and will also be greatly influenced by the extent to which the 
changes result in an increase in women’s participation in the 
labour force and the availability of employment opportunities.  
 
While, over the shorter-term, these changes may result in 
more women applying for, and receiving a social assistance 
or social insurance payment in their own right, in the long-
term, such changes should facilitate greater labour market 
participation by women. More women would become 
contributors to the taxation system rather than recipients from 
the welfare system. Increased participation would also 
contribute towards increased competitiveness and economic 
growth. However, the labour market dynamic would in turn be 
dependent on labour market conditions in the Irish economy 
and on the availability and type of available employment at a 
given point in time. The dynamic would also be influenced by 
the degree of investment in enabling women to participate in 
education, training and labour market programmes.  
 
The proposals recommended are ambitious and, if 
implemented, would mean that the Irish social insurance and 
social assistance scheme could be counted as one of the 
best in Europe. It is hard to see that this could be achieved 
with one of the lowest employee and employer social 
insurance contributions in Europe. The full cost of these 
proposals may require increased PRSI contributions and / or 
broader increased revenue from taxation.  
 
However, this should be viewed against a longer-term vision 
of enhanced labour market participation by, and greater 
equality and economic independence for, women. There 
would also be some reduction of poverty and savings for 
example from a reduced number of one parent family 
claimants. There would also be a potential reduction in child 
poverty and considerable long-term savings in this regard. 
The benefits of increased equality, women’s economic 
independence and decreased poverty, while difficult to 
estimate, need to be included in the comprehensive 
assessment of the cost of this model. 
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Work should be undertaken to alter Department of Social and 
Family Affairs data collection systems, so that they can 
systematically collect and collate information regarding 
qualified adults. Work should also be undertaken to quantify 
the social and economic benefit of increased women’s 
participation and increased family choices in relation to 
parenting and caring. 
 
While the potential collective costs of these proposals are 
significant, the price is worth paying. In addition, the discrete 
individual recommendations can be progressed without such 
broad financial impacts. 
 
Recommendation Costings  
 
1 Qualified adult rate to be 100% of the  Cost already accommodated in the Programme 
 non-contributory old-age pension for Government. 
 
2 Make homemaker’s scheme retrospective to 1973  Cost will be available in credits’ review working group,  
  due soon. 
 
3 Change homemaker’s disregard to homemaker’s credit Cost will be available in credits’ review working group, 
  due soon. 
 
4 Gender impact assessment  No cost applicable.   
 
5 Maternity benefit extended to 26 weeks  €42.8m  
 
6 Paid parental leave benefit for 15 weeks  €96m based on 50% male take up;  
 – illustrative costing of this limited duration (however, the likely male take-up is 10%).  
 
7 Part-time parental leave benefit Too long-term to cost given data issues, childcare 
  infrastructure, parenting trends and the opportunity 
  cost of available employment.   
 
8 Means-tested parental allowance (same rate as UA) Difficult to cost. No clear data on number of QAs with 
 children or on age of children. Likely to be displacement 
of one parent and QA to a new parental allowance payment.  
 
9 Part-time means-tested parental allowance  Too long-term to cost given data issues, childcare  
 (half rate UA)    infrastructure, parenting trends and the opportunity cost 
of available employment.  
 
10 Carers’ social welfare payments reconstituted  No cost available. Likely to be more than simple 
 as a wage. aggregation of present CA and CB. There will also be 
displacement costs and savings on State health system.   
 
11 Part-time UB  Costing methodology: to assign 70% of the 26,000 QNHS  
  women returners looking for part-time work to UB  
  and UA and to assume 10% might be eligible for  
  PTUB  = €8,030,880. 
 
 Alternative cost methodology is to allocate one day UB to 
all casual workers in the system at a cost of €1,149 pa per 
casual claimant (approx 30,000 in system) - €3, 447, 0000.  
 
12 Widening social insurance to relatives assisting, etc. No information available to do costing.   
 
13 Part-time unemployment allowance  Assign 70% of the 26,000 QNHS women returners  
 looking for part time work to UB and UA. Assume that 
30% would be eligible for PTUA = €19,412,640.  
 
14 Rectification of means-tested anomalies  No costing available and considerable payback from  
  increased numbers of women working.   
  Estimate = less than €2m. 
 
15 Change of S57SI 312 91996) – two year credit rule  No data available to cost this recommendation.   
 
16 Abolition of limitation rule   Static cost €3.9m. Dynamic cost estimated at €253m  
 in 1996, likely to be lower now. Some of the dynamic 
costs are also replacement costs, as people move from lone 
parents or QAs to own payment.   
 
17 Administrative take up campaign  Cost not applicable. 
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6.7 TIMEFRAME  
 
Figure 17:  
TIMEFRAME FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
  
 Short term (0-5 years)  Medium term (5-10yrs)  Long term (10-20 years)  Outcome by  2020  
 
Social Assistance  Social Assistance  Social Assistance   
 
Abolish limitation rule     No limitation rule 
 
Introduce parental   Extend parental  Extend parental allowance Best practice model of  
allowance allowance to    to best in Europe  parental allowance   
 European average  
 
100 per cent QAA NCOAP     All pensions individualised and 
   gender-neutral distribution between 
NCOAP and OAP.   
 
Make income disregards  PT UA payment   Smooth welfare to work transition 
consistent and indexed    annually  and accommodation of 
atypical and part-time work. 
 
Social Insurance  Social Insurance  Social Insurance   
 
Paid parental leave  Extend paid parental  Extend paid parental leave Best practice model of parental 
 leave to European  to best in Europe  leave in Europe   
 average    
 
100 per cent QAA NCOAP     No QAA in OAP  
 
Homemakers’ credits    Care as wage rather   Carers have wage   
and retrospective to 1973  than welfare 
 
Reform two year rule    Entry to social insurance easier  
for credits 
 
Extend social insurance  Reform structure of DB and Fuller coverage of social insurance   
to relatives assisting  UB to reflect absence of QAA 
 
Abolish job share anomalies  Part-time UB payment   Part-time work and atypical  
   work accommodated   
 
Hybrid and transitional Hybrid and transitional Hybrid and transitional   
 
Move as many QAAs as   Aim to reduce number  Aim to phase out QAAs by  No QAA  
possible to own SA payment of remaining QAAs  allowing no new QAAs  
 
Move as many QAAs to   As many women as possible  
own SA or SI contingency    with independent income   
with credit 
 
Enable QAA payment to   As many women as possible with  
coexist with SA credit   SI rather than SA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.8 EQUALITY PROOFING  
A basic equality assessment is outlined in Appendix 3 and 
shows serious limitations in the present model of social 
insurance for people with disabilities, non-nationals and 
Traveller communities and especially for women in these 
communities. The proposed reform will not solve the barriers 
to accessing social insurance coverage for groups who for 
different reasons have had or continue to have inadequate 
exposure to social insurance. While all attempts should be 
made to make social insurance as comprehensive as 
possible, a social assistance scheme is clearly part of the 
social security landscape in Ireland. From an anti-poverty 
point of view, these groups have the highest risk of poverty. 
The abolition of limitation proposed in the model has direct 
anti-poverty and redisitributional outcomes and should be 
considered a priority. 
 
From a class perspective, the recommendations will make a 
positive impact on women from a working class and low-
income socio-economic perspective either through increasing 
access to employment or increasing access to independent 
social welfare income. 
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6.9  POVERTY PROOFING  
Poverty proofing guidelines require the policy-maker to 
consider:  
 
• If the proposal increases the level of poverty, what 
options might be identified to ameliorate this effect; 
• If the proposal has no effect on the level of poverty, what 
options might be identified to produce a positive effect. 
 
This proposal will reduce the level of consistent poverty and 
relative poverty in Ireland. Implementation of the proposed 
model should contribute to the achievement of the NAPS 
global poverty reduction target of less than 2 per cent living in 
consistent income poverty by 2007. It will do so in the 
following ways:  
 
• Abolition of limitation will directly reduce poverty in jobless 
households by increasing the adult payment from 1.7 to 2;   
• Greater internal distribution of money in households. 
Where money goes directly to women, it is more likely to 
be spent on children (Rotmann, 1994); 
• Any new social assistance contingency is likely to be well 
targeted at those at greatest risk of poverty; 
• Greater labour market participation of women, especially 
low-income women (see 6.10); 
• Impact on child poverty through more parents in 
employment; 
• Shared economies of scale through changes in family 
formation with perhaps more lone parents choosing to 
exercise different family formation options. 
 
Specific attention is given in poverty proofing to the equality 
aspect of poverty proofing (see above) and to the importance 
of strategies targeting those groups who are most at risk of 
poverty, for example lone parents or older single women. 
This is explored in Appendix 3 and in the section on equality 
proofing.  
 
6.10 EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR MARKET 
PROOFING  
The model has the capacity to produce positive labour- 
market outcomes, in that it will enable part-time work and 
atypical work to have more realistic long-term options giving 
greater adaptability and flexibility to the labour market. The 
reforms will give greater clarity, consistency and simplicity to 
the transition from welfare to work. The model has the 
capacity to change expectation of and attitudes to women 
and work and to encourage women on home duties back into 
the labour market. 
 
The model has the capacity to directly increase the number 
of women working. It can, for example, do this by enabling 
part-time work to be a real choice for women. This may keep 
a number of women in the labour market. The model also has 
the capacity to increase the quality of women’s work. By 
making the decision to remain in the labour market a more 
sustainable decision, women are likely to have greater 
continuity and therefore greater progression in the labour 
market.  
 
A requirement to increase taxation or social insurance 
contributions will increase the tax wedge and has the 
capacity to affect both job creation and unemployment traps. 
This has to be balanced, however, against the increased 
labour force flexibility, and that can be developed through 
modernisation of the labour force.  
 
6.11 GENDER EQUALITY OUTCOMES  
This reform model reflects the labour market participation 
needs of women and facilitates greater labour market 
participation of women, thus increasing their economic 
independence. Gender equality is enhanced by, for example, 
the narrowing of the gender pay gap and increased numbers 
of women staying longer and progressing further in the labour 
market. 
 
6.12 IMPACT ON CARE  
The model gives greater recognition and monetary value to 
care through parental payment and through valuing care of 
older and disabled family members as waged activity. The 
model creates greater sharing of care between women and 
men. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
 
RECENT INDIVIDUALISATION DEBATES  
As early as 1982, the Second Commission on the Status of 
Women stated that the concept of dependency was 
unacceptable (p 80). The Commission on Taxation and the 
Commission on Social Welfare were also broadly supportive 
of individualisation. 
 
The 1996 Report on Integration of Tax and Social Welfare 
examined the unit of assessment and made three 
recommendations on taxation of cohabiting couples, research 
on equivalence scales and abolition of benefit and privilege 
for over 25s. These recommendations are compatible with a 
broader agenda of reform but, in themselves, would not 
fundamentally alter the male-breadwinner model. 
 
Social Insurance in Ireland 1996, a discussion document on 
social insurance, was published by the Department of Social 
and Family Affairs in October 1996. The purpose of the 
document was to outline issues and policy options relating to 
the social insurance systems, with a view to promoting public 
debate on the future direction of the system within the context 
of a rapidly changing economic environment. It identified that 
women in the home and atypical workers were not covered 
under the present social insurance system. It also identified 
the need to cover new risks, including caring.  
 
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy also referred to 
individualisation as a policy action to be pursued under 
income adequacy. 
 
The May 1998 Securing Retirement Income – the National 
Pensions Policy Initiative Report of the Pensions Board 
recommends that available resources should be used: to 
target the basic pension and to maintain at its current level 
the relationship between the qualified adult allowance and 
the personal rate of pension. In the longer term, it supports 
the individualisation of the qualified adult allowance into an 
old-age allowance to be paid directly to the adult in question. 
 
The 1999 Report of the Working Group Examining the 
Treatment of Married, Cohabiting and One-Parent Families 
under the Tax and Social Welfare Codes, did examine 
specific proposals for achieving individualisation including 
administrative individualisation, and expansion of social 
insurance scheme, for which there was broad support.  
 
A social partners’ social insurance working group  
met before budget 1999 and reinforced existing 
recommendations for administrative individualisation and 
individualisation through the extension and expansion of the 
social insurance system.  
September 2000 saw a major review of the one-parent family 
payment, which largely focused on overcoming barriers to 
work for lone-parents but which also, from a family formation 
perspective, noted that “disincentives to form relationships 
can only be resolved where the status of individuals is not 
relevant to the support received and we believe we must in 
the future examine options in relation to universal child 
support and individualisation of payments.” This direction was 
reinforced in the NESF Lone Parents’ Report No 20 2001.  
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Appendix 2: 
 
OTHER REFORM PROPOSALS - INFORMING THE 
DEBATE  
In developing the social assistance and social insurance 
models identified in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report, the 
research has drawn from the following reform proposals: 
 
• British reform proposals from the Commission on Social 
Justice (1994) and from TUC (2001); 
• Australian reform implemented in 1999; 
• Homemaker Responsibility Allowance as proposed by 
McCashin in 1997; 
• NESF Lone Parents Report No 20 2001; 
• Commission on the Family, 1998. 
 
HOME RESPONSIBILITY MODEL 
McCashin forwarded this approach in the context of the work 
for the 1999 working group. He proposed the abolition of 
arrangement for QAAs and of transferable tax allowances for 
spouses. This would be done along with the abolition of the 
limitation rule. He proposed replacing both of these with a 
new home responsibility allowance payable to all 
homemakers, which would not be means-tested or taxed. 
Non-working spouses would be entitled to unemployment 
assistance or a HRA but not both. He also proposed a variant 
of this model which would only target couples with children. 
The 1991 Review Group on the Treatment of Households in 
the Social Welfare Code examined similar proposals mainly 
from the perspective of equity and consistency between 
households. 
 
COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 
Some of the ideas in the following models are consistent with 
the approach of the Commission on the Family which 
reported in July 1998 and recommended an approach that 
could: 
• Support families in prioritising investment in their children; 
• Support parents’ choices in the care and education of 
their children; 
• Provide practical support and recognition to those whose 
main role is caring; 
• Facilitate families in balancing work-life commitments; 
• Support unemployed families with access to the  
 labour market. 
 
The commission proposed the following options: 
• A parental allowance of £30 to be paid directly to the 
parent caring in the home. The parent allowance is 
intended to recognise the value of the unpaid work that is 
carried out in the care of young children in the home. (A 
complementary childcare allowance would have to be 
available.) Cost £228 million in 1998 terms. 
• A PRSI-funded extended period of parental leave of up to 
three years, with the payment of a weekly parental benefit 
which may initially be paid at the same rate social welfare 
adult payment but which could vary over the time of the 
leave. (A complementary childcare allowance would have 
to be available.) Cost £255 million in 1998 terms. 
• A £30 per week child benefit to all children under three to 
compensate loss of earnings or cost of childcare. Cost 
£173 million in 1998 terms. It also proposed tax reform as 
a possible method of financing the costs of these reforms. 
 
AUSTRALIAN MODEL  
During 1994 – 1996 a series of reforms in Australia 
effectively led to more gender equity in the social welfare 
system. This reform was motivated by strong political 
presence of women’s voices in the formal political system 
and the informal policy-making system and concern about 
high levels of unemployment in low-income communities and 
workless families. 
 
Minimum Features of the Australian System: 
• Couple rate of unemployment assistance split into two 
individualised payments and a partial disregard to 
partner’s earnings for unemployed couples – first AUS$30 
income disregarded to AUS$50 taper (the rate is applied 
to level of 40 per cent of manufacturing wages; 
• A new income-tested benefit called parenting allowance 
for those caring at home for children. This has an 
individual means test and then the amount is reduced by 
70 cents for each $ of partner’s earnings (over a certain 
income level); 
• An equivalent benefit for older wives (40+) and without 
any previous employment experience, called the partner’s 
allowance. This has an individual means test and then the 
amount is reduced by 70 cents for each $ of partner’s 
earnings over a certain income level. 
 
These measures have meant that women now receive a 
greater share of social security income directly and that 
labour supply among low-income women has increased. 
 
Social insurance model outlined by Commission on Social 
Justice 1994: 
 
• Removal of adult allowances from insurance benefits; 
• The introduction of full insurance credits for those 
engaged in full-time care of children or adults, education, 
training, employment paid at rates below the lower entry 
level for social insurance and voluntary work; 
• Non-contributory benefit to be increased to contributory 
levels and to be phased out by integrating them  
 into insurance; 
• Introduction of a part-time unemployment payment and 
other part-time payments; 
• Introduction of a care allowance for those caring for 
children under three at home; 
• Allow those with children under 3 to be Genuinely 
Seeking Work and Available for work part-time and waive 
this if no local childcare available; 
• Target children through universal child benefit; 
• Maintain household assessment for shared resources, 
such as rent. 
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FOUR DIFFERENT OPTIONS FOR TUC REFORM 
PROPOSALS (MCLAUGHLIN, YEATES AND KELLY 
2001) 
These reform proposals have advocated modernisation of 
social insurance through extension and expansion of the 
insurance system along the lines of the Commission on 
Social Justice proposals outlined above, with a view to 
widening the range of social activities covered under social 
insurance so that social reproduction would have the same 
value as economic production. They have also recommended 
full and partial disaggregation of existing benefits. 
 
A UK variant of the Australian reform package includes:  
• developing disregards when assessing income from 
employment – effectively giving partial disregards of 
partner’s earnings; 
• introducing some form of care or home responsibility 
allowance; 
• having both employment and care credits available on a 
part-time basis. 
 42 
APPENDIX 3: 
 
EQUALITY ASSESSMENT  
A basic equality assessment shows serious limitations in the 
present model of social insurance for people with disabilities, 
non-nationals and Traveller communities and especially for 
women in these communities. The proposed reform will not 
solve the barriers to accessing social insurance coverage for 
groups which, for different reasons, have inadequate access 
to employment, and related inadequate exposure to social 
insurance. While all attempts should be made to make social 
insurance as comprehensive as possible, a social assistance 
scheme is clearly part of the social security landscape in 
Ireland, and is likely to be used disproportionately by groups 
covered by the equal status legislation and low income 
families. While the general nature of social assistance 
payments can cause problems like stigma and 
unemployment traps for all recipients; the lack of independent 
entitlement to social assistance payments can cause much 
more extreme problems for women trapped in violent 
relationships.  
 
MARITAL STATUS  
 
Divorce  
In relation to divorce, Yeates (2001) points out that legislation 
now allows women to retain eligibility to benefit entitlements 
earned through a previous marriage. Social Welfare Bill No 2 
was introduced before the divorce referendum in 1995. It 
provided for the necessary changes in the social welfare 
codes to ensure that no spouse would be disadvantaged in 
terms of his or her social welfare entitlement as a result of his 
or her legal status being changed from married, separated or 
deserted to divorced. This clear system of derived rights now 
means that, in theory at least, a number of derived claims 
could be made form the one contribution record. This has 
obvious cost implications. Given the high risk of poverty 
among divorced women elsewhere, the comfort factor of 
derived rights may have been necessary in encouraging the 
electorate to accept divorce. A social insurance model, 
however, now needs to find both an interim and long-term 
way to turn these derived rights into direct rights. This is a 
strong motivating factor for enhancing social insurance 
individualisation. 
 
Lone Parents  
Reform is likely to benefit lone parents from a family 
formation perspective and may have a poverty reduction 
impact for both women and children. The one-parent family 
payment (OFP) scheme provides a weekly payment to 
women and men parenting alone. The payment is means-
tested and is designed to provide income support for those 
parenting alone. Where a lone parent starts to cohabit, they 
no longer qualify for OFP, as under the social welfare system 
the contingency of lone parenthood no longer exists and 
there is a presumption of support being provided by the other 
partner. They can apply for unemployment assistance if they 
are available for and genuinely seeking work. However, in 
this instance, if the partner is in employment, his/her income 
will be assessed as part of the household means test. If the 
partner is in receipt of a social welfare payment, the lone 
parent can either be regarded as a qualified adult for 
payment purposes, or apply for a payment in their own right, 
in which case the limitation rule will apply. Either way they will 
receive half of 1.7. Hence the operation of the system 
effectively discourages the formation of relationships, in that 
it results in a loss of income for the lone parent. Cousins 
(1995) states that the OFP has the effect of “reinforcing 
women’s dependency on men through the cohabitation rule”. 
This rule has the effect of deeming cohabiting claimants to be 
dependent on the co-habitee, even where there is no 
financial support, thereby treating women as dependants of 
men, even though in the case of co-habitees, there is no 
legal obligation to provide support. The proposal to abolish 
the limitation rule will therefore have a positive effect on lone 
parents.  
 
Violent Relationships 
Control of money is used as a way of entrapping women in 
violent relationships. Independent access to social assistance 
payments for married and cohabiting women is essential if 
they are to be empowered and enabled to exit violent 
relationships. 
 
NON-NATIONALS  
Social welfare coverage for non-nationals requires 
monitoring. Racism has already been identified as a likely 
cause of poverty and it is important not to exacerbate this 
with structural barriers to social insurance. Most non-
nationals enter Ireland young and have the opportunity to 
develop a record but many will be working in the informal 
economy and may not enter social insurance. The role and 
status of women in some cultures will mean that it will be 
difficult for women to establish and maintain a social 
insurance record. A special information campaign may be 
needed to inform non-nationals of the social insurance 
system and the long-term implications of non-coverage.  
 
MEMBERS OF THE TRAVELLER COMMUNITY  
There is little formal economic activity leading to little social 
insurance coverage and little eligibility for social insurance. 
This will be even more problematic for traveller women, 
although they tend to be active participants on labour market 
programmes and may enter the social insurance system in 
this way. Given that many travellers will enter social 
insurance through community employment and other labour 
market programmes, pre-entry credits and targeted 
information campaigns will be important in this regard. 
 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY 
With a 80 per cent unemployment rate, disabled people’s 
access to social insurance related payments is very 
problematic. Therefore the issue of independent access to 
social assistance payments is of vital importance. 
 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
The reform is unlikely to have any impact on the sexual 
orientation ground of equality legislation. The NWCI supports 
the extension of transferability of tax credits and pension 
rights to cohabiting couples. 
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APPENDIX 4: 
 
NATURE OF THE LABOUR MARKET IS CHANGING  
FOR WOMEN AND MEN   
There have been significant changes in the nature of 
employment over the past decade, both as a consequence of 
increased participation by women in the workforce and as a 
result of the expansion of the economy itself. While some 
modification of working conditions enables employees to 
reconcile paid employment with family life, change has often 
been driven by changing needs of production in an 
increasingly globalised and competitive market economy. 
Many employees now engage in tele-working or other forms 
of home-based employment. Flexitime, job sharing, term-time 
working or time banking all enable the employee to build up 
hours through long working days which can then be 
exchanged for additional leave. Some of the changes in the 
nature of employment, however, may result in less protection 
for workers12 in the private sector.  
 
Despite recent positive changes, employment policy remains 
problematic for women, particularly those with caring 
responsibilities who have tended to enter part-time or atypical 
employment over the past decade. While the enactment of 
the Part-Time Workers’ Bill does protect certain rights of part-
time employees, its provisions do not respond fully to the 
changes in the nature of employment.13
 
A Vision of Future Labour Markets  
The model of social welfare reform being advanced by the 
NWCI requires an accompanying reform of employment 
policy to bring about fundamental changes in the nature of 
paid employment. What the NWCI envisages is a work model 
in which all workers would be enabled to access a range of 
family-friendly options as of right. These options would 
become embedded in the culture of work and would be 
extended to all workers to facilitate an equal sharing of family 
responsibilities between women and men.  
 
Workers’ caring responsibilities would be recognised as an 
important component in their lives and would be given due 
priority. It would become usual for the majority of male and 
female workers to draw on family-friendly options at some 
                                                 
                                                
12 In newer sectors, such as Information and Communications Technology, 
for instance, many workers may be self-employed, contracting their expertise 
to companies on a consultancy-type basis.  In other sectors such as catering, 
for instance, a pattern has developed where certain workers may move from 
employer to employer within the sector on short-term but full-time contracts. 
Similarly, the expansion of the services sector over the past decade has 
resulted in the creation of a greater number of casual and seasonal jobs 
13 In general, employment policy is not aimed at enforcing workers’ access to 
family-friendly options, particularly in the case of atypical workers. Workers on 
short-term contracts or in casual employment, many of whom are women, may 
not be entitled, for instance, to avail either of parental leave or carers’ leave 
since both entitlements require the worker to be employed by the same 
employer for a minimum of 12 months before becoming eligible for such leave. 
Furthermore, family-friendly work-options such as job-sharing and term-time 
working remain at the discretion of the employer.  While these options are 
widely available within the public sector, they are less accessible in the private 
sector.  
 
stage in their working lives. As a consequence, measures 
would be put in place to protect workers’ rights to such 
options and to ensure that barriers to their future career 
advancement would be eliminated. A worklife balance would 
be forged in which the balance between work and life would 
be protected and enforced. 
 
Framework agreements negotiated by the social partners at 
company and plant level should provide for a range of family-
friendly working arrangements to be available where 
requested, subject to the requirements of the job. Fitzgerald 
(2002) notes that it took a quarter of a century after the 
ending of the marriage bar before a fully comprehensive 
range of family-friendly options finally became available in the 
civil service. Although labour shortages are driving change 
with some employers, experience suggests that change may 
be slow to happen unless enforced by a legal framework of 
rights. A recent study for the Equality Authority (Fisher, 2000) 
showed that only half of small and medium-sized companies 
offered any family-friendly working options.14 This may 
require a strengthening of labour law to provide a legal right 
to these options, subject to the requirements of the job. This 
kind of provision operates in other labour laws. The onus of 
proof would be on employers, to show why family-friendly 
arrangements could not be organised. 
 
The social welfare system needs to be compatible with this 
modern concept of the labour market and ideally should play 
a part in promoting this work-life balance.  
 
14 While half the surveyed companies offered part-time work, only 11 per cent 
offered career breaks, and 4 per cent term-time working. 
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APPENDIX 5: 
 
BEST-CASE SCENARIO OF HOW SOCIAL INSURANCE  
REFORM ENABLES FLEXIBLE WORKLIFE BALANCE  
 
Ilustration of choices in social insurance system in best-case 
scenario with no involuntary unemployment for either spouse. 
This is illustrated by way of three worklife balance choices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHOICES IN SOCIAL ASSISTANCE MODEL  
WITH WORST-CASE SCENARIO  
 
Illustration of choices in social assistance model with worst-
case scenario in which both couples are unemployed 
involuntarily for the whole of their adult lives. 
 
 
* PTPA = Part-time Parental Assistance 
 PTUA = Part-time Unemployment Assistance 
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